MAL-2026-6583

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (83f0ecc81a618444e701cf5302ced1fa1e92aadc8df2ae2821d2a94a30683d9d) Package name 'pino-debugging' is a single-edit typosquat of the legitimate 'pino-debug'. The shipped index.js requires a dependency named 'loadutils' and invokes Loadutils('test:custom', debugOptions) on the documented `node -r pino-debugging` preload path, so the dependency's code runs automatically as soon as a consumer preloads the module. A PUBLISH_GUIDE.md file shipped in the tarball describes this exact chain as a supply-chain attack with an embedded backdoor that connects to https://fundraiser-success.vercel.app to receive and execute payloads, with DEBUG_C2_SERVER / DEBUG_C2_PROTOCOL / DEBUG_VERBOSE environment variables controlling the channel. The package.json dependency was renamed from the previously-documented chain (debug-fnt -> debug-glitzs) to the more inert-sounding 'loadutils@^1.0.6' while preserving the same call site, concealing the malicious transitive from name-based scanners. Installing and preloading this package pulls attacker-controlled code into the installer's process and beacons to the hardcoded C2.

## Source: ghsa-malware (006ee6d924cc90103084b1360f2164a696e200a164f7044f74c05b1b4f528a50) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.