MAL-2026-4781

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## Source: amazon-inspector (8ab3b19e4bd1602de93ca092a5909f8b69927c01d5a690d3484116024dfc46e2) Package impersonates the well-known sindresorhus/unique-string utility: package.json copies the author block (name 'Sindre Sorhus', email sindresorhus@hotmail.com, homepage sindresorhus.com), repository field 'sindresorhus/unique-string', and README verbatim, despite not being published by that author. The default export, when invoked as uniqueString(64), AES-256-CBC-decrypts a hardcoded ciphertext (key derived from sha256('256-key')) and hands the plaintext to globalThis.eval, with 'eval' reconstructed obfuscation-style by joining the first letters of ['error','vertex','alphabetic','length']. Before reaching the eval branch, the code consults node-env-detector and short-circuits to a warning log when env.isCI || env.isNpmBot || env.isContainer || env.isVirtualMachineLikely is true — a deliberate sandbox/CI evasion gate so the hidden payload only fires on real developer or production hosts. The combination of identity-spoofed metadata, encrypted eval'd payload, and analysis-evasion gating is an unambiguous supply-chain attack: the installer cannot see what code runs, and the package's stated purpose (generate a unique string) does not require eval, AES decryption, or CI detection.