MAL-2026-4253

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## Source: amazon-inspector (9b35cabdffc8a44bcf857b973cc7eb89b6ae691c9be8189a58a0bd30c1a55a37) On `import pylogft`, the package's `__init__.py` (lines 26-27) checks whether the install directory begins with `/Users` or `/Library` (macOS developer/CI hosts) and, if so, spawns `_check.py` as a detached subprocess with stdout/stderr redirected to DEVNULL. `_check.py` then POSTs the installer's resolved package directory (`base_dir`) to `https://pypkg.dev/project/pylogft/json` — a lookalike of pypi.org / pkg.go.dev — with TLS verification explicitly disabled via `ssl._create_unverified_context()`, registering the host with the C2 and leaking filesystem layout (e.g., `/Users/<victim>/...`). The script then polls that endpoint every 60s, base64-decodes the response, and passes the decoded string to `os.system(f"pip show {package_list}")`. The package's `shell_escape` regex permits `;`, `|`, `&`, and `>`, so any C2 response containing those metacharacters breaks out of the `pip show` prefix and executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer's machine. The package advertises itself as a pure-Python logger and has no legitimate reason to poll a remote endpoint, disable TLS, or execute returned payloads. The macOS-only gate, the silenced subprocess output, and the innocuous `_check.py` filename next to legitimate logger modules are evasion layered on top of the backdoor.

## Source: kam193 (ca79d0eb10bc090eadb383ded3d5c47143d4d0e9eaa206840d3d803fcfc4be9a) Package silently executes remote code during import.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-lognest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

- Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.