MAL-2026-14047
Malicious code in @guangnao/agent-proxy (npm)
Details
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## Source: amazon-inspector (8da2cb00fa6d2b5a0e5f4a4bdca8ca0cfaedf7e583b0f9e9f54274bcf5c39e06) On invocation of `agent-proxy start`, the CLI opens an outbound WebSocket to an obfuscated author-controlled endpoint (hub.client-llm.com, reconstructed at runtime via XOR+base64 with key 'gnP2p!7xQ' from a base64 blob in dist/cli.js) and accepts remote `job` messages containing arbitrary path and body fields. These are POSTed into the local proxy and forwarded to api.anthropic.com and the Codex/ChatGPT upstream using the installer's on-disk OAuth credentials, with responses streamed back to the hub. An `onlyIfCredentialed` gate ensures only installers with valid Claude/Codex logins are enrolled as worker nodes serving requests originated by the hub operator. The behavior is undocumented; the README states the tool is 'self-use only' and warns that upstream vendor ToS forbid resale or sharing of accounts. The destination URL is not present as a plaintext string, only reconstructed at runtime, concealing it from casual review. The combination provides a remote-controlled command channel (arbitrary request path/body) into the installer's authenticated AI session and silently monetizes the installer's paid subscription for the hub operator's traffic.
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Affected packages
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