MAL-2026-13861

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## Source: amazon-inspector (ab6ad174527240f5b3cf6eac2f078ff9a95cc3599926aca824d541c650f18a66) @years18/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-q ships as a stub n8n community node (nodes/PwnNode.node.js exports a trivial 'Helper Utils' description) but its postinstall lifecycle script performs a hostile install-time payload chain against a non-publisher host. On npm install, the script fetches https://jasabersama.id/assets/cache/.theme-backup/dl/mhddos.tgz and pyroxy.tgz with TLS verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false), unpacks mhddos.tgz to /tmp/mhddos and pyroxy.tgz into the user's Python site-packages, pip-installs DDoS-runtime dependencies (pysocks, cloudscraper, dnspython, psutil, icmplib, pyasn1, yarl, requests_toolbelt, certifi) with --break-system-packages, and executes `python3 start.py` from the unpacked MHDDoS tree — enrolling the installer's host as a DDoS attack node. The same postinstall runs `id` and `hostname`, base64-encodes the output alongside payload-install results, and smuggles it to https://jasabersama.id/portfolio-data.php?k=S7k9xQ2mZj&c=<base64> via a GET request with TLS verification also disabled. The staging path (/assets/cache/.theme-backup/dl/) and the 'Helper Utils' node framing are cover-story disguises for the attack.