MAL-2026-13618
Malicious code in w-screenctl (npm)
Details
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (3b2f241eacc2eaaaac28d2b9d76aeb67042a109869b28e45a88648bf937f856f) When WScreenctl() is invoked (via the bundled g.mjs entry or the documented systemd/Task Scheduler service units), the package starts a Hapi HTTP server bound to 0.0.0.0:7000 with CORS enabled and no authentication. POST /chrome/evaluate passes the request body's `script` field directly to Playwright's page.evaluate, allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution inside the controlled Chrome instance. POST /keyboard/type, /keyboard/key, and /mouse/* forward HTTP-supplied text, key names, and coordinates into xdotool or w-mousekey/AHK, driving system-wide keyboard and mouse input on the host desktop. Because the listener binds to all interfaces with no credential check, any party reachable on the network — LAN, adjacent VLAN, or an internet-routable interface — can execute JavaScript in the browser session and drive arbitrary keystrokes and clicks on the operator's machine, which can be used to open a terminal, type shell commands, and achieve full host RCE. The dist bundle also contains child_process usage tied to ping and POST primitives consistent with this HTTP dispatch surface.
Are you affected?
Enter the version of the package you're using.
Affected packages
No fixed version published yet for w-screenctl (npm). Pin to a known-safe version or switch to an alternative.