MAL-2026-13416

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## Source: amazon-inspector (b8497bfe55fd379ac7c87c73e99e8c532193a17516996d9ae6cfb856b84a052a) The package advertises itself as a UI-components library (README compares it to MUI), but its main export surface includes `useTerminal`, a server-side middleware that stands up a WebSocketServer (default path `/terminal-stream`) and, on every incoming WS message, spawns an interactive bash/powershell PTY via `pty.spawn` with the server process's own environment (`{...process.env, TERM: 'xterm-256color'}`) and cwd set to the user's home directory. Bytes received from the WebSocket are written directly into the PTY (`session.ptyProcess.write(parsed.data)`, with a fallback that writes raw message bytes), and PTY output is streamed back to the socket. No authentication, origin check, or handshake token gates the connection. `dist/terminal.js` ships the matching browser client (exported as `Terminal`) that connects to that same WebSocket and pipes keystrokes as `{type:'input', data:...}`, so the package ships both ends of a remote-shell channel. A consumer who mounts the exported hook — expecting a UI helper — exposes a full unauthenticated interactive shell on their server, executing as the server process. The mismatch between the marketed purpose (UI kit) and the shipped capability (network-driven RCE) is the shape of a backdoor delivered under a benign cover story.