MAL-2026-11903

npm/@servicetitan/microfront-tests is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (add06e0ef9b2ac476f15580b0b412dddb1fae2621cc17fcdd1d83e9a6cf5f4cd) @servicetitan/microfront-tests@0.0.11 ships a preinstall hook (package.json scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs") that, on every `npm install`, downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases into a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and uses it to execute a 727KB bundled JavaScript file (math_init.js) at the tarball root. math_init.js is a `@bun @bun-cjs` bundle with obfuscator-style shuffled string/opcode arrays and hex-mangled identifiers; setup.mjs itself uses `_0x`-prefixed obfuscated identifiers. The filename (math_init) and the payload's purpose are unrelated to the package's advertised functionality: the dist/ entry point is a small test helper that only re-exports ts-mockito and a couple of container/utils modules. The advertised @servicetitan scope is a well-known enterprise publisher, but the shipped payload is decoupled from the advertised public surface — consistent with a compromised or malicious publish smuggling a dropper into a test-helper package. Invocation via a freshly downloaded alternate runtime evades Node-oriented scanners and hands arbitrary code execution to whatever math_init.js contains, on any host that runs `npm install` on this version.

## Source: ghsa-malware (e5b54d614586f4478b82e5186e47cc7ce506a464fc6a73c5f0c3ec48b92f9355) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.