MAL-2026-11819

npm/@servicetitan/anvil-react is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (644e3638bae7d14c320c96d1d963f291749946c85e236cd56090ecfd2bc155fa) The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs", which runs on npm install before any user interaction. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style obfuscated (_0xNNNN identifiers, per-function string dictionaries) and downloads the Bun runtime binary (bun-v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727 KB obfuscator.io-style bundle (shuffled string array with a WV8StW rotator, ~1500-entry mixed dictionary n7gIxM, indirect character-decoder hc1jfK9, hex-renamed identifiers) whose contents cannot be inspected as-shipped. Executing the payload under a freshly downloaded alternate runtime bypasses Node-based scanners and hooks. The rest of the tarball is a normal @servicetitan React design-system library (Alert, Button, Calendar, Dialog components re-exported from dist/ui-react.cjs); the preinstall dropper and math_init.js are unrelated to that UI purpose, consistent with a hijacked or malicious release published under the @servicetitan scope. The math_init.js payload is also directly executable by any pre-existing bun on the installer's PATH.

## Source: ghsa-malware (96f1e6debfb78670cc82904126cef7f5012178bd65e04a12d8896fa440951812) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.