GHSA-q4gh-4ffp-5cg8

### Summary When `hideConfigSecrets: true` is enabled, MagicMirror redacts `SECRET_*` environment placeholders in the HTTP `/config` response, but the shared node-helper socket dispatcher expands `**SECRET_NAME**` placeholders in every inbound socket payload before passing it to module helpers. Any client that can connect to a loaded module namespace can send a placeholder such as `**SECRET_API_KEY**` and cause the server to substitute the real environment variable into the helper payload. Helpers that echo attacker-controlled payload fields, such as the default weather helper error path, can return the secret value to the socket client.

### Details The affected product is the npm package/application `magicmirror` at version `2.36.0`, tested at commit `fb41d24ef522e91e802e2a623ff6afbddeb3c9d8` from `https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror.git`.

The secret-redaction feature is implemented during config loading:

- `js/utils.js:117-123` loads a `config.env` file next to the config file into `process.env` when present. - `js/utils.js:130-151` creates both a full config and a redacted config. - `js/utils.js:137-140` redacts environment variables whose names start with `SECRET_` to `**SECRET_NAME**` in the redacted config when `hideConfigSecrets: true` is present. - `js/server.js:112-125` returns either `configObj.redactedConf` or `configObj.fullConf` from `/config` depending on `config.hideConfigSecrets`.

The disclosure root cause is the inbound socket dispatcher:

- `js/node_helper.js:88-103` registers a catch-all handler for each module namespace. - `js/node_helper.js:91-99` checks `config?.hideConfigSecrets` and, for every inbound object payload, runs `replaceSecretPlaceholder(JSON.stringify(payload))` before invoking `socketNotificationReceived(...)`. - `js/server_functions.js:23-34` implements `replaceSecretPlaceholder(...)` by replacing `**SECRET_* **`-style placeholders with `process.env[...]`, unless `global.config.cors === "allowAll"`.

This reverses the redaction boundary: redacted placeholders intended for the browser can be sent back to the server and expanded into real environment secret values inside helper payloads.

A confirmed echo path exists in the default weather helper:

- `defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js:12-19` accepts `INIT_WEATHER` from the socket. - `defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js:27-31` copies `config.instanceId` from the attacker-controlled payload. - `defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js:47-52` attempts to dynamically load the requested weather provider. - `defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js:86-91` catches errors and sends `WEATHER_ERROR` with the same `instanceId` back to the namespace.

False-positive screening performed:

- This is not a generic environment leak through `/env`; `js/server_functions.js:221-240` returns only selected client environment paths. - The HTTP `/config` route does redact placeholders when `hideConfigSecrets: true`; the issue is that the inbound socket path expands those placeholders again before module helper code runs. - `replaceSecretPlaceholder(...)` intentionally refuses substitution when `global.config.cors === "allowAll"` (`js/server_functions.js:29-34`); the positive PoC used `cors: "disabled"`, which is the shipped default (`js/defaults.js:14`). A negative control with no substitution produced the placeholder unchanged. - The attacker must know or infer a `SECRET_*` variable name. If the attacker can read the redacted `/config` response, placeholder names may be disclosed even when values are hidden. The PoC uses a known `SECRET_MM_AUDIT` test variable. - Network reachability follows the Socket.IO exposure model. With the shipped default `address: "localhost"` and loopback `ipWhitelist`, remote network reachability is limited. In documented non-loopback deployments, this combines with the Socket.IO access-control gap described separately.

Affected-version evidence: only `magicmirror@2.36.0` at commit `fb41d24ef522e91e802e2a623ff6afbddeb3c9d8` was tested. The affected range is unknown from this audit; earlier versions were not tested. No patched version or fix commit was identified locally.

### PoC The following safe local PoC was run from a clean checkout of MagicMirror at commit `fb41d24ef522e91e802e2a623ff6afbddeb3c9d8`. Because `node_modules` were not installed in this audit environment and `package.json:52` has a destructive `postinstall`, the command uses dependency stubs while executing the vulnerable repository dispatcher and weather helper code. It writes no files and does not contact external services.

Positive trigger:

```bash node -e 'const Module=require("module"); const orig=Module._load; Module._load=(r,p,m)=>{ if(r==="express") return { static:()=>()=>{} }; if(r==="logger") return {log(){},error(){},warn(){},info(){},debug(){}}; if(r==="#server_functions") return {replaceSecretPlaceholder:(input)=>input.replaceAll(/\*\*(SECRET_[^*]+)\*\*/g,(_m,g)=>process.env[g])}; return orig(r,p,m); }; require("./js/alias-resolver"); global.root_path=process.cwd(); global.config={hideConfigSecrets:true,cors:"disabled"}; process.env.SECRET_MM_AUDIT="secret-marker-42"; const Weather=require("./defaultmodules/weather/node_helper"); const helper=new Weather(); helper.setName("weather"); const sent=[]; helper.sendSocketNotification=(n,p)=>sent.push({n,p}); let onAny; const fakeIo={of(){return {on(_ev,cb){const socket={onAny(fn){onAny=fn;}}; cb(socket);}};}}; helper.setSocketIO(fakeIo); Promise.resolve(onAny("INIT_WEATHER",{instanceId:"**SECRET_MM_AUDIT**",weatherProvider:"definitely-not-a-provider",type:"current"})).then(()=>setTimeout(()=>{console.log(JSON.stringify(sent));},10));' ```

Observed output:

```json [{"n":"WEATHER_ERROR","p":{"instanceId":"secret-marker-42","error":"Cannot find module '/home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/providers/definitely-not-a-provider.js'\nRequire stack:\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/[eval]"}}] ```

Expected vulnerable output: the weather error payload returned by the helper contains `"instanceId":"secret-marker-42"`, proving the server substituted the `SECRET_MM_AUDIT` environment variable into an attacker-controlled socket payload and returned it to the client.

Negative/control trigger simulating no inbound placeholder substitution:

```bash node -e 'const Module=require("module"); const orig=Module._load; Module._load=(r,p,m)=>{ if(r==="express") return { static:()=>()=>{} }; if(r==="logger") return {log(){},error(){},warn(){},info(){},debug(){}}; if(r==="#server_functions") return {replaceSecretPlaceholder:(input)=>input}; return orig(r,p,m); }; require("./js/alias-resolver"); global.root_path=process.cwd(); global.config={hideConfigSecrets:true,cors:"allowAll"}; process.env.SECRET_MM_AUDIT="secret-marker-42"; const Weather=require("./defaultmodules/weather/node_helper"); const helper=new Weather(); helper.setName("weather"); const sent=[]; helper.sendSocketNotification=(n,p)=>sent.push({n,p}); let onAny; const fakeIo={of(){return {on(_ev,cb){const socket={onAny(fn){onAny=fn;}}; cb(socket);}};}}; helper.setSocketIO(fakeIo); Promise.resolve(onAny("INIT_WEATHER",{instanceId:"**SECRET_MM_AUDIT**",weatherProvider:"definitely-not-a-provider",type:"current"})).then(()=>setTimeout(()=>{console.log(JSON.stringify(sent));},10));' ```

Observed control output:

```json [{"n":"WEATHER_ERROR","p":{"instanceId":"**SECRET_MM_AUDIT**","error":"Cannot find module '/home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/providers/definitely-not-a-provider.js'\nRequire stack:\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/[eval]"}}] ```

Expected control output: the placeholder remains `**SECRET_MM_AUDIT**`, showing that the positive case depends on the vulnerable server-side placeholder expansion step.

Final repro re-check: both the positive and negative harnesses were re-run after drafting, and the observed outputs above are from this environment. No cleanup was required.

### Impact Any client that can connect to a module Socket.IO namespace can disclose `SECRET_*` environment variables by sending known placeholder names in object payloads that are expanded by `js/node_helper.js` before helper processing. This undermines the purpose of `hideConfigSecrets: true`: secrets are hidden in the HTTP config response but can be converted back into their real values through inbound socket payloads.

The confidentiality impact depends on what the deployment stores under `SECRET_*` variables. MagicMirror configurations commonly include API tokens, calendar credentials, service keys, or network allowlist values in config/environment variables. The PoC proves disclosure of a test secret through a default helper echo path.

CVSS 3.1 rationale: AV:A because MagicMirror is intended for trusted local/private networks and remote exploitation requires a reachable local/private-network deployment; AC:L because once namespace access is available the attacker only needs a known or guessed `SECRET_*` name and an invalid weather provider to trigger the echo; PR:N because no application authentication is required; UI:N because the attacker sends socket messages directly; S:U because the impact is disclosure of secrets from the vulnerable application's own process environment; C:H because environment secrets can include credentials/API tokens; I:N/A:N because this report proves disclosure only.

### Suggested remediation Do not expand `SECRET_*` placeholders in inbound socket payloads. The redaction boundary should be one-way: server-to-client responses may contain placeholders, but client-to-server messages must not be treated as authority to retrieve real environment values.

Concrete fixes:

- Remove the `replaceSecretPlaceholder(JSON.stringify(payload))` call from `js/node_helper.js:91-99` for inbound socket payloads. - If a specific module legitimately needs secret material, resolve it only from server-loaded trusted configuration, not from client-supplied placeholders. - Keep `hideConfigSecrets` redaction for `/config`, but avoid disclosing placeholder names to clients when not necessary. - Add regression tests that set `hideConfigSecrets: true` and `SECRET_TEST=value`, send a socket payload containing `**SECRET_TEST**`, and assert that every helper receives/returns the literal placeholder rather than the secret value.