GHSA-f84p-cvgm-xgjj

## Summary

`pbts` invoked JSDoc by building a shell command string from input file paths and executing it through `child_process.exec`. File paths containing shell metacharacters could therefore be interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to JSDoc as plain arguments.

## Impact

An attacker who can control file names or paths passed to `pbts` may be able to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the process running `pbts`.

This affects the protobufjs CLI tooling path. The protobufjs runtime APIs for encoding, decoding, parsing, and loading protobuf messages are not directly affected by this issue.

## Preconditions

- The application or user must invoke `pbts` on file paths influenced by an attacker. - The attacker must be able to supply or create a path containing shell-significant characters. - The vulnerable `pbts` version must execute the generated JSDoc command through a shell.

## Workarounds

Do not run affected versions of `pbts` on attacker-controlled file names or paths. If this cannot be avoided, sanitize or rename input files before invoking `pbts`, or run the CLI in an isolated environment with minimal privileges.