GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743

## Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Image tool allowed attackers to force OpenClaw to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or restricted network targets.

## Affected Versions

- npm: openclaw <= 2026.2.1

## Patched Versions

- npm: openclaw 2026.2.2 and later

## Fix Commits

- 81c68f582d4a9a20d9cca9f367d2da9edc5a65ae (guard remote media fetches with SSRF checks) - 9bd64c8a1f91dda602afc1d5246a2ff2be164647 (expand SSRF guard coverage)

## Details

The Image tool accepts file paths, file:// URLs, data: URLs, and http(s) URLs. In vulnerable versions, http(s) URLs were fetched without SSRF protections, enabling requests to localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata targets.

This was fixed by routing remote media fetching through the SSRF guard (private/internal IP + hostname blocking, redirect hardening, DNS pinning).

## Exploitability Notes

- Requires attacker-controlled invocation of the Image tool (direct tool access, or a gateway/channel surface that forwards untrusted `image` arguments into tool calls). - The image tool expects the fetched content to be an image. Many high-value SSRF targets return text/JSON (for example cloud metadata endpoints), which will typically fail media-type validation. In practice, the most direct confidentiality impact comes from internal endpoints that actually return images (screenshots/renderers, camera snapshots, chart exports, etc.). - Remote fetches are GET-only with no custom headers. Some metadata services require special headers or session tokens (for example GCP `Metadata-Flavor`, AWS IMDSv2 token), which can further reduce the likelihood of direct credential theft in some environments. - Despite the above constraints, SSRF remains a powerful primitive: it can enable internal network probing and access to unauthenticated/internal HTTP endpoints, and can chain with other weaknesses if present.

Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.