GHSA-2ppx-66jv-wpw5

### Summary

A resource-scoped API token can read script contents outside its allowed path scope via `GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search`.

This appears to be a remaining variant of the scoped-token authorization class previously addressed for other endpoints. The route-level scope middleware validates the token domain/action, but does not enforce the resource/path segment of a scope. `scripts/list_search` then returns script `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace without applying per-row path filtering against the token scopes.

### Affected endpoint

`GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search`

### Affected versions

Confirmed in the current public repository code and believed to affect the latest published release at the time of review:

`<= 1.714.1`

Patched version: unknown.

### Details

Windmill supports scoped API tokens with scopes in the format:

`{domain}:{action}[:{resource}]`

The parser supports resource-scoped values such as:

`scripts:read:f/allowed/*`

and the codebase contains helpers for resource matching, including wildcard matching.

However, the route-level scope check used for requests with scoped API tokens only validates the route domain and action. It does not compare the token's resource/path restriction against the requested route or against the rows returned by list endpoints.

For `scripts/list_search`, the handler returns `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace:

`SELECT path, content from script WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND archived = false LIMIT $2`

There is no additional `check_scopes(...)` call in the handler and no per-row filtering based on the token's resource/path scope.

As a result, a token intended to read only scripts under one path prefix may be able to read script contents from unrelated paths in the same workspace.

### Source-level reproduction

1. Create or use a workspace containing at least two scripts:

- `f/allowed/script_a` - `f/private/script_b`

2. Create a scoped API token intended to read only the allowed path:

`scripts:read:f/allowed/*`

3. Use that token to call:

`GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search`

4. Expected behavior:

The response should include only scripts matching the token's resource scope, e.g. only scripts under:

`f/allowed/*`

5. Actual behavior from source review:

The route-level scope check accepts the request as `scripts:read`, and the handler returns script `path` and `content` for scripts in the workspace without filtering the rows by the token's resource scope.

This can expose script source code from paths outside the token's intended scope.

### Impact

A user or integration holding a path-restricted `scripts:read:{resource}` token may be able to read script contents from unrelated scripts in the same workspace.

Depending on how scripts are used, this may disclose:

- internal automation logic, - integration details, - business logic, - inline configuration, - accidentally hardcoded secrets or credentials.

This does not require admin privileges. It requires possession of a valid scoped API token for the workspace.

### Related context

This appears related to the broader class of issues where route-level token scope enforcement validates domain/action but not the resource/path portion of the scope. Similar scoped-token issues appear to have been fixed for other endpoints, such as resources/variables listing and job preview/run paths, but I did not find an equivalent fix for `scripts/list_search`.

### Suggested fix

Apply resource/path scope enforcement to `scripts/list_search`.

Possible approaches:

1. Add explicit handler-level authorization similar to per-resource endpoints. 2. Filter returned rows so that a scoped token only receives scripts whose `path` is included by at least one `scripts:read:{resource}` scope. 3. Add regression tests for: - `scripts:read:f/allowed/*` cannot see `f/private/script_b`, - broad `scripts:read` still sees all accessible scripts, - unscoped tokens preserve current behavior, - filter-tag-only tokens preserve current compatibility behavior.

A more defensive long-term fix would be to make route-level scope enforcement aware of resource/path restrictions where the route contains a concrete resource path, while list endpoints should apply per-row filtering.