RUSTSEC-2026-0328

The tar-family extractors in `decompress` (`.tar`, `.tar.gz`, `.tar.xz`, `.tar.bz2`, `.tar.zst`) build each output path from the **raw archive entry path** and write to it with no traversal check, so a malicious archive can write files **outside** the destination directory, a "tar-slip" / zip-slip path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23).

In `src/decompressors/tar_common.rs` (`tar_extract`):

```rust let filepath = entry.path()?; // raw entry path let filepath = filepath.components().skip(opts.strip).collect::<PathBuf>(); // strips leading components only — keeps `..` let outpath = to.join(filepath); // ... let mut outfile = fs::File::create(&outpath)?; // writes anywhere ```

`.components().skip(opts.strip)` removes a fixed number of *leading* path components but leaves interior `..` components intact so an entry named e.g. `../../../../home/<user>/.bashrc`, or an absolute path, resolves **outside** `to`. This affects all platforms.