MAL-2026-16415

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (22c22841398a01b681136598baf046a8ad9ad9ef6d728899a0fbce056ff66369) The package's package.json declares an `install` lifecycle script that runs `node index.js`, which loads `runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js`. That file resolves the `os` and `dns` core modules indirectly through `module.constructor._load` with char-code-array names to avoid appearing in a normal `require` graph, then reads `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and the basename of `process.cwd()`. Those values are concatenated as DNS labels together with a hex-decoded destination domain and issued as a `dns.resolve4` query to a subdomain of `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, a DNS-based out-of-band exfiltration collector. The destination hostname and the core-module names are stored as char-code arrays and decoded at runtime, and the logic is split across helper files (b2e6f8.js/c3f7a9.js) under a `telemetry/probe` cover directory. Every `npm install` of this version therefore leaks the installing user's username, machine hostname, and working-directory name to an attacker-controlled domain, and the obfuscation shows the destination and API surface were deliberately hidden.