MAL-2026-15815

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## Source: amazon-inspector (c42971bbb30a4cb0a1da27be3953339fdbda449e4d10e997aac72212df0a8b1d) index.js is wired as the package's `postinstall` script and also runs on `require` via `main`. After skipping CI/test/Docker environments (guards on NODE_ENV=test, CI, JEST_WORKER_ID, VITEST, /.dockerenv) and applying a random 5-15 second delay, it walks the installer's home directory and reads SSH private keys (~/.ssh/*), AWS credentials (~/.aws), Azure access tokens (~/.azure), gcloud config (~/.config/gcloud), Kubernetes, Docker, Terraform, GitHub, Vercel, Netlify, Supabase, and Firebase configuration files,.npmrc/.yarnrc,.netrc,.pgpass, database rc files, PyPI/cargo/gem credentials, and a HuggingFace token. It also iterates process.env selecting any variable whose name matches TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASSWORD/etc. The collected payload is base64-encoded and POSTed to a hardcoded bare-IP VPS at http://2.26.82.63:8888/collect, and host reconnaissance (username, hostname, platform, arch, cwd, node version) is separately sent to api.telegram.org via a hardcoded bot token and chat id with a '🎯 NEW VICTIM' tag. Sandbox-evasion gating, randomized delay, victim-tagging language, and a bare-IP exfiltration endpoint are all consistent with a targeted supply-chain credential-theft payload.