MAL-2026-11942

npm/@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-ui-anvil2 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (4164027a255d3913f9a3da8ba29b52aedd57007e4996821b1ac89651d3c6fdbe) The package advertises itself as a React chatbot UI library but declares a preinstall script (`node setup.mjs`) whose contents are obfuscated with `_0x`-prefixed identifiers and string-dictionary lookups. On `npm install`, setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from `github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<ver>/<archive>.zip`, extracts and chmods the binary, and invokes it against the sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB blob prefixed `// @bun @bun-cjs` containing string-array rotation and constant-table obfuscation; it is only executable under the fetched Bun runtime and is inert under Node, defeating Node-based inspection. The payload name (`math_init`) has no relation to the declared React UI purpose, and neither the runtime fetch nor the payload contents are described in the package's advertised functionality. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper install-time-RCE shape: install-time code fetches an alternate runtime and hands it an opaque bundled blob to execute on the installer's host, hidden from Node-based supply-chain scanners.

## Source: ghsa-malware (20a2b68aee4ba132c8d13195579e72a053bb3ce705eeb5d739c72d9a1e7bbde0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.