MAL-2026-11907

npm/@servicetitan/mpa-components is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (8b96492abed6bc71a22932ed806b2a2eeef38e9626af2e95e977c169f308c776) The package's `scripts.preinstall` runs `node setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime binary from oven-sh's GitHub release CDN, extracts and chmods it, then invokes it via `execFileSync` against a locally-shipped `math_init.js` — a single-line 727KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` bundle protected by a shuffled string-array decoder and hex-obfuscated identifiers. The `setup.mjs` wrapper itself is obfuscator.io-style renamed (`_0x488df8`, `_0x19328d.YCZJE(execFileSync,...)`). The package's stated purpose is a React UI-components library for ServiceTitan marketing, which has no need for an alternate JavaScript runtime or a large opaque loader. Bun is used to execute the sibling obfuscated bundle rather than to run any documented package code, so the runtime download is not the aggressive-but-legitimate official-runtime-install pattern — it is a mechanism to hand `npm install` execution to opaque bundled code that Node-based install-time scanners will not read. The `@servicetitan` scope lends the package trust in CI/build environments that resolve packages under that namespace.

## Source: ghsa-malware (9ab8faf004fb4768284cf55fa31f94f48f332292142067db15bdce65545e4bf8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.