MAL-2026-11848

npm/@servicetitan/culture is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (7d5a3316a312b0cb7631a92f6a6e711fc6ee749829ed2a8a0ed62773076455cf) The package's npm preinstall hook runs `node setup.mjs`, which downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temp directory, chmod +x's it, and immediately invokes it against a sibling file `math_init.js` via `execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], { stdio:'inherit', cwd:D })`. `math_init.js` is a 727 KB single-line bundle marked `// @bun @bun-cjs`, opaque under a string-array rotator (`WV8StW`) and a custom-alphabet base64-like decoder (`hc1jfK9`), with no discernible relationship to the package's declared purpose. The advertised main entry (`dist/index.js`) is a 16-line React culture provider that neither requires Bun nor references `math_init.js`; the sole effect of the preinstall is to pull an alternate language runtime purely to execute an obfuscated sibling payload, which is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and evades tooling that only inspects Node-resolved code. The package publishes to public npm under the `@servicetitan` scope with `homepage: docs.st.dev` and `repository: github.com/servicetitan/anvil-uikit-contrib.git`, and the mismatch between the trivial advertised library and the hidden Bun-executed payload is consistent with dependency-confusion / scope-hijack targeting ServiceTitan internal builds.

## Source: ghsa-malware (0f24e3a61a356b024857fa70d19bc74d788ff7244a81826a6a83af3a9f3770bd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.