MAL-2026-11826

npm/@servicetitan/anvil2-ext-common is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (000fc6465001194d6dcd8984b6e23ef9bce2ef62c72e25762c74e4d65770c022) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style wrapper-object indirection, hex-named identifiers hiding the strings 'ldd', '/etc/os-release', 'Alpine', 'bun', 'powershell', 'Expand-Archive', and the GitHub download URL). At npm install time it downloads a pinned Bun release from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (or uses a locally installed bun), extracts the bun binary, chmods it +x, and execFileSyncs the sibling file math_init.js under it. math_init.js is a ~730 KB single-line file with a `// @bun @bun-cjs` header containing a shuffled string array (n7gIxM) rotated by an obfuscator.io-style rotator (WV8StW) and a decoder (hc1jfK9); standard deobfuscators fail to fully unpack it. The tarball ships under the @servicetitan scope with a README describing the legitimate ServiceTitan Anvil2 React component library, but package.json has empty author, description, and keywords. A React UI component library has no legitimate need to fetch an alternate JavaScript runtime and execute a large opaque payload at install; the Bun-runtime dispatch bypasses Node-focused install-time analysis and hands arbitrary code execution to whatever math_init.js contains on every installer machine.

## Source: ghsa-malware (ac55602d114a5d2d113428b41e9b27b6766a5d7bcfe8d4d192cccd19ce940d3a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.