MAL-2026-11816

npm/@servicetitan/anvil-fonts is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (bdc6e859d8453a89526bd1ac8c4bb3823dcc9efad2061a45b1c05663c392d54e) This font-distribution package declares a preinstall lifecycle hook `node setup.mjs`. `setup.mjs` is itself obfuscated (hex-random identifiers, string-map dispatchers) and probes for a system `bun` binary; when absent, it downloads a Bun runtime from oven-sh's GitHub releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it 0755, and uses that fresh Bun binary to execute the sibling file `math_init.js` via `execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D,'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D})`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` bundle with a large numeric string-map (`n7gIxM`), a rotation function (`WV8StW`), and a custom-alphabet decoder (`hc1jfK9`); all identifiers are hex-random and endpoints/strings are reassembled at runtime from the map rather than appearing as literals. The README advertises this package as a static font/CSS/SCSS/LESS asset bundle consumed by webpack — only `dist/` needs to ship — so a preinstall hook that fetches a second language runtime and executes an obfuscated ~727KB bundle under it has no relationship to the package's stated purpose. Executing the payload under a freshly dropped Bun runtime also bypasses tooling that only inspects Node-resolved code paths. Behavior is consistent with a hijacked or typosquatted release of this scope's font package.

## Source: ghsa-malware (87a2f4f02c2344c831230b3f06fd926d5b3b999601654d85a7ef3e247093dced) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.