MAL-2026-10916

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## Source: amazon-inspector (8daa66fc6fa92869318e5a544d82fab2d5dff870dc4c6784f28733f84441415a) The package's setup.py copies a telemetry.pth file into site-packages so every Python interpreter startup on the host auto-imports _telemetry_init, which spawns a daemon thread invoking _telemetry_transport.Client.initialize(). That client selects a platform-keyed asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) from a list of anonymous Cloudflare Workers mirrors (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, cf8oobworker/cf12oobworker/cf17-ddb/cf25-6eb.workers.dev), downloads the binary with no version pinning or hash verification, chmods it 0o755, and executes it (Windows uses ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess). A fallback ServiceDiscovery routine opens raw UDP sockets to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 and issues TXT lookups against tin/tina/ldr/win.dl.well1.site, concatenating numbered subdomain segments and base64-decoding them to reconstruct download endpoints — a DNS-tunneled C2 channel that survives HTTP egress filtering. The package self-describes as a Sentry-style analytics SDK (Level, DSN, Envelope, Hub, DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out) with placeholder metadata (Author: Platform Engineering, Summary: Internal SDK module); the analytics surface is a cover story for the download-and-execute chain. The.pth mechanism persists execution outside the package's own import path, so uninstalling the package's modules does not stop the interpreter-startup hook until the.pth file itself is removed from site-packages.

## Source: kam193 (2b75d4d8e3c822aa82b716e6752c0901447845d442973ce9bc35c78b9c81c78a) Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.

This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i

Reasons (based on the campaign):

- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

- Downloads and executes a remote executable.

- covering-tracks

- persistence

- abuses-pth

- data-stored-in-dns