GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j

## Summary

Several API endpoints in `authenticated` mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed.

Verified against the latest version.

Discord: sagi03581

## Steps to Reproduce

### 1. Unauthenticated issue data access

`GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in `server/src/routes/activity.ts` calls `assertCompanyAccess`, but this one was missed.

```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues # -> [] (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403) ```

If an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials.

### 2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation

`POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659` skips any auth verification.

```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"command":"test"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges # returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API key ```

The response includes a `boardApiToken` that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation.

### 3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage

These endpoints in `server/src/routes/access.ts` require no authentication:

```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/index # returns all available skill endpoints

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip # returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including: # - every API endpoint and its parameters # - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats) # - the complete agent coordination protocol # - the agent creation/hiring workflow

curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent # returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configs ```

This hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available.

### 4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure

`GET /api/health` returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags.

```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/health # { # "deploymentMode": "authenticated", # "deploymentExposure": "public", # "authReady": true, # "bootstrapStatus": "ready", # "version": "2026.403.0", # ... # } ```

Tells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running.

## Impact

- **Data exposure**: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone. - **Reconnaissance**: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else. - **Auth bypass stepping stone**: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately).

## Suggested Fixes

1. **Add authentication to heartbeat run issues** in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`: - `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` -- add `assertCompanyAccess` like every other endpoint in the same file

2. **Add authentication to CLI challenge creation** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`: - `POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` -- add `assertBoard` at minimum

3. **Add authentication to skill endpoints** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`: - `GET /api/skills/available` - `GET /api/skills/index` - `GET /api/skills/:skillName`

4. **Reduce health endpoint information** -- consider removing `deploymentMode`, `deploymentExposure`, and `version` from the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behind `assertBoard`

5. Consider a **global auth rejection middleware** for all `/api/*` routes in `authenticated` mode. Currently unauthenticated requests get `actor: { type: "none" }` and pass through to `next()`, relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejecting `type: "none"` at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely.

## Contact

Discord: sagi03581

Happy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.