GHSA-wxmm-q36w-r9xj

## Summary

MariaDB Connector/J does not enforce `allowLocalInfile=false` when processing server-initiated LOCAL INFILE requests (protocol packet type `0xfb`). However, exploitation is constrained: the server can only request the exact filename the client already included in its `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query, it cannot redirect to arbitrary paths.

## Details

When a client executes `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/path/to/file'`, the connector sends the filename to the server as part of the COM_QUERY. A rogue or MitM server responds with a `0xfb` packet echoing that same filename. The connector, without checking `allowLocalInfile`, transmits the file content.

The bypass is therefore limited to the file the application itself intended to load. The attacker cannot escalate to other files (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) unless the application's own query targets them.

The real-world risk is: - An application that uses `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` on potentially sensitive files (credentials, exports, configs) and connects over an untrusted network. - `allowLocalInfile=false` is supposed to disable this entire mechanism as a defense-in-depth measure, but the flag is ignored.

## Impact

The security guarantee of `allowLocalInfile=false` is not upheld, but practical exploitation requires both a MitM/rogue server and an application that actively uses LOCAL INFILE on sensitive data.

## Credit

Reported by tharavel