GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj

`GitPython` version `3.1.50` blocks unsafe `git clone` options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` unless callers explicitly pass `allow_unsafe_options=True`. However, the default unsafe-option gate does not recognize joined short-option forms such as `-u/path/to/helper`.

Git itself accepts `-u<upload-pack>` as the short form of `--upload-pack=<upload-pack>`. As a result, `Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False)` can execute the helper command even though the equivalent long option is blocked.

Affected package:

- Ecosystem: PyPI - Package: `GitPython` - Confirmed affected version: `3.1.50` - Repository: `gitpython-developers/GitPython` - Current PyPI version during triage: `3.1.50`

Relevant behavior:

- `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` correctly lists `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe clone options. - `Repo._clone()` splits `multi_options` with `shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options))` and then calls `Git.check_unsafe_options(...)`. - `_canonicalize_option_name("-u/path/to/helper")` returns a string beginning with `u...`, not the canonical short option `u`, so it does not match the blocked `-u` entry. - Git accepts the same joined short option as `--upload-pack=<helper>` and executes the helper during clone.

Preconditions:

An application must pass attacker-influenced clone options into `Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=...)` while relying on GitPython's default unsafe-option gate to block command-executing options.

The local PoC uses only a local bare Git repository and a local helper script. It does not contact any third-party service.

Local reproduction:

The PoC creates a disposable bare Git repository, a helper script, and a sentinel file path. It first confirms that the long `--upload-pack=<helper>` form is blocked by GitPython. It then calls `Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False)`.

Observed sanitized output:

```text gitpython_version=3.1.50 git_version=git version 2.53.0.windows.1 tmp_dir=<tmp> long_upload_pack_gate=BLOCKED:UnsafeOptionError joined_short_upload_pack_gate=ALLOWED clone_result=EXPECTED_EXCEPTION:GitCommandError sentinel_exists=True sentinel_text=GITPYTHON_UNSAFE_OPTION_BYPASS ```

The clone fails because the helper exits nonzero, but the sentinel file proves that Git executed the helper despite `allow_unsafe_options=False`.

Impact:

An attacker who controls `multi_options` can bypass GitPython's default `allow_unsafe_options=False` protection and execute a local command via Git's `--upload-pack` / `-u` clone option. This is a residual bypass of an explicit GitPython security boundary, not merely a case where a caller opted into unsafe behavior.

Duplicate / related advisory checks:

- OSV query for `PyPI/GitPython` version `3.1.50` returned no vulnerabilities. - The repository's public advisories include related unsafe Git option issues, including `GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485` / `CVE-2026-42284` and `GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4` / `CVE-2026-42215`. Their public affected ranges are marked as fixed before 3.1.50. - `GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485` describes validating `multi_options` before `shlex.split(...)`. GitPython 3.1.50 now validates after splitting, but the joined short option `-u<value>` still bypasses because the validator canonicalizes it to `u<value>` rather than `u`. - `GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4` describes unsafe underscored kwargs such as `upload_pack=...`. The current PoC uses `multi_options=["-u<helper>"]` against 3.1.50 and does not depend on underscored kwargs. - GitHub issue search for `upload-pack unsafe options` found historical related items, including CVE-2022-24439 and the earlier unsafe-options gate work, but no public issue describing this current joined-short-option residual bypass in 3.1.50. - GitHub issue search for `multi_options unsafe` found PR #2130, which fixed splitting of `multi_options` before checking. The current issue remains after that split because `-u<value>` is treated as option name `u<value>`, not blocked short option `u`. - GitHub issue searches for `u<upload-pack> unsafe` and `-cfoo` returned no results.

Suggested remediation:

When checking unsafe Git options, parse joined short options that take values. For clone, `-uVALUE` and `-cKEY=VALUE` should be canonicalized to `u` and `c` respectively before comparing against the unsafe option set.

A safer approach is to maintain command-specific metadata for unsafe short options and recognize the bare option, split form, joined form, and long `--option=<value>` / `--option <value>` forms.