GHSA-q69g-4hcv-6jg4

## Summary

A **Windows-specific** command injection vulnerability exists in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` when the CLI is invoked with the `--workspace <value>` option. User-supplied `--workspace` values can be passed to a shell command without proper neutralization on the Windows fallback execution path, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands.

The vulnerability was fixed in version [6.0.0][v6.0.0].

## Vulnerability Details

When `cyclonedx-npm` is executed with the `--workspace` option, the provided argument is incorporated into an internal command execution flow. On **Windows systems**, this path can interpret untrusted `--workspace` input as shell syntax if not safely handled.

As a result, specially crafted workspace names can break out of the intended command context and execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the invoking user.

## Impact

An attacker who can influence the value passed to `--workspace` can execute arbitrary OS commands **on Windows hosts**. This may lead to:

* Arbitrary command execution * Data exfiltration * Local privilege escalation (depending on runtime context and privileges) * Modification or destruction of files accessible to the user running the CLI

The vulnerability affects only scenarios where:

* The user invokes `cyclonedx-npm` with `--workspace <value>`, and * The vulnerable execution path is reached on **Windows**.

## Exploitation Conditions (High-Level)

Exploitation requires the attacker to supply or influence the `--workspace` value passed to the CLI. If the tool falls back to the vulnerable shell execution path on **Windows**, specially crafted workspace identifiers can cause unintended command execution. No exploit code is included here to avoid providing weaponizable examples.

## Root Cause

The CLI fallback execution path on **Windows** constructed a shell command using untrusted input from the `--workspace` option. Because the fallback code path does not sanitize or escape the workspace value, special shell metacharacters (e.g., `>`, `&`, `|`) are interpreted by the shell, enabling command injection.

## Fix

The vulnerability was resolved in [PR #1489], which ensures workspace values are handled safely and are no longer passed to a vulnerable shell execution path.

The fix is included in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` version [6.0.0][v6.0.0].

## Remediation

* Upgrade to version [6.0.0][v6.0.0] or later, which contains the complete fix. * As a temporary mitigation for older versions, ensure that the environment variable `npm_execpath` is set to a `npm-cli.js` before invoking the tool. * Avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled values to the `--workspace` option. * If immediate upgrade is not possible, prioritize mitigation on **Windows systems**, where exploitability exists.