GHSA-mhq8-78pj-5j79

### Summary

On POSIX nodes, OpenClaw's `system.run` safe-bin checks could approve a command before shell expansion changed how the command was interpreted. A value that appeared to be a safe-bin argument could expand into additional shell words and become a file operand.

This issue is limited to paired POSIX node execution through `system.run` with safe-bin or allowlist-style auto-approval. It is not an unauthenticated node takeover.

### Affected configurations

This affects deployments where:

- a POSIX node is paired to the gateway - `system.run` is reachable by an authenticated operator or agent flow - exec policy uses safe-bin or allowlist-based auto-approval - the approved command contains shell-expanded values that can change argv shape

### Impact

A lower-privilege operator flow could cause an approved safe-bin command to read a node-local file that was not intended by the policy. Depending on the local files available to the node process, this could expose OpenClaw configuration data or other node-local information.

The issue is a policy-enforcement gap in argv validation, not a general statement that every safe-bin command is unsafe.

### Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.

### Mitigations

Upgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.18` or later. Before upgrading, avoid broad safe-bin auto-approval for commands that can read arbitrary paths, and prefer explicit approval for node commands that touch local files.