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HIGH8.8

GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3

Shopper: privilege escalation via improper Livewire admin component authorization

Quick fix

GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 — shopper/framework: upgrade to the fixed version with the command below.

composer require shopper/framework:^2.9.2

Details

## Summary

Three Livewire admin components in `shopper/framework` (latest master at commit `fcd0c59`, released as v2.8.0) gate state-mutating actions on the read-only `view_users` permission. This is the same class as the issue Shopper fixed in v2.8.0 / PR #511 / [GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch](https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch) — the PR moved most write actions from `view_users` to `access_setting`, but three were missed (one of them is a brand-new file added by the security commit itself).

A staff user holding only `view_users` + `access_dashboard` (a realistic "support" or "viewer" role per Shopper's own `PermissionsTableSeeder`) can: (1) self-escalate by granting any permission to their own role; (2) create a brand-new admin team member with a chosen password and the `admin` role and then log in as that user; (3) delete arbitrary `permissions` rows (RBAC DoS) or — when `can_be_removed=true` — delete entire roles.

CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 (High). CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) + CWE-862 (Missing Authorization).

## Vulnerable components (paths relative to repo root)

### 1) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Team/Permissions.php`

- `togglePermission(int $id)` at line 28 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');` - `removePermission(int $id)` at line 55 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`

The Permissions blade at `packages/admin/resources/views/livewire/components/settings/team/permissions.blade.php` line 34 emits every permission's `id` directly in `wire:click` handlers, so the attacker does not even need to guess IDs — the page itself enumerates them.

Net effect: any user who can mount the Permissions component (gated on `view_users`) can grant any permission row to the bound `$role`. Granting `access_setting` to the attacker's own role unlocks every action that PR #511 supposedly hardened with `->authorize('access_setting')`. Granting `delete_customers`, `edit_orders`, `edit_products`, `add_brands`, etc. is direct data-modification escalation.

### 2) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/SlideOvers/CreateTeamMember.php`

- `mount()` at line 53 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');` - `store()` at line 122 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`

This file is `new file mode 100755` in commit `fcd0c59` — it was created as part of the security fix and inherited the same misclassified gate.

`store()` creates a `User` with `email_verified_at = now()`, the attacker's chosen password, and any selected `role_id`. The `Radio::make('role_id')` options filter only excludes `config('shopper.admin.roles.user')`, so the `admin` role is selectable. Log out, log in as the new account → full admin.

### 3) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Settings/Team/RolePermission.php`

- `deleteAction` at lines 81-90: only gated by `->visible($this->role->can_be_removed)`, with no `->authorize()` chain.

Page-level `mount` (line 52) requires only `view_users`. For any role with `can_be_removed = true`, a `view_users`-only user can call the action and delete the role (cascading the loss of permissions for every assigned user).

## Self-confirmation in the project's own test suite

The following tests are green on master @ `fcd0c59` — they ARE the PoC:

``` tests/Admin/Livewire/Components/Settings/Team/PermissionsTest.php line 14-16: `givePermissionTo('view_users')` only line 36-45: "can toggle permission to role" — passes line 74-85: "can remove permission" — passes

tests/Admin/Livewire/SlideOvers/CreateTeamMemberTest.php line 16-18: `givePermissionTo('view_users')` only line 29-56: "can create new team member" — passes, asserts the new user `hasRole('manager')` ```

A `view_users`-only Livewire user actor successfully toggles permissions, removes permissions, and creates a new privileged user — verified by Shopper's own regression tests.

## Suggested fix

Change `$this->authorize('view_users')` to `$this->authorize('access_setting')` in:

- `Permissions::togglePermission` - `Permissions::removePermission` - `Permissions::mount` (defence in depth, matches `Team\Index`) - `CreateTeamMember::mount` - `CreateTeamMember::store`

Add `->authorize('access_setting')` to `RolePermission::deleteAction` (matches the pattern already applied to `generatePermissionsAction`, `createPermissionAction`, and `Team\Index::DeleteAction`).

Update the two regression tests to use `access_setting` instead of `view_users` so they accurately reflect the privilege boundary.

## Resources

- Prior advisory of the same class: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch - Fix commit that introduced these residual gaps: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/commit/fcd0c5920588702df5b874f432b1042abd77a50b - CWE-285 Improper Authorization - CWE-862 Missing Authorization

### Credits

Reported by Vishal Shukla(@shukla304) using sechub.dev AI Agent

### Support

If this disclosure was useful and if users would like to support continued open-source security research and responsible-disclosure work, they can sponsor at https://github.com/sponsors/therawdev — Shoppers thanks those who keeping open source safe.

Are you affected?

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Affected packages

Packagist/shopper/framework
Introduced in: 2.8.0Fixed in: 2.9.2
Fixcomposer require shopper/framework:^2.9.2

References