GHSA-gqvg-gmmx-x4hm

## Summary

MLflow introduced `MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION` as a security control to prevent unsafe `pickle.load` execution during model loading, in response to CVE-2024-37052 through CVE-2024-37060. When set to `False`, operators expect all pickle deserialization to be blocked. The most recent related fix (#21188) patched a bypass in the pyfunc flavor.

However, the `mlflow.statsmodels` flavor completely omits this guard. An attacker who places a crafted MLmodel artifact into any accessible artifact store can trigger arbitrary code execution on any process that calls `mlflow.pyfunc.load_model()` against the malicious model — **even when `MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION=False`**.

This is a security control bypass. The operator believes pickle RCE is mitigated; the statsmodels flavor silently ignores the control.

---

## Root Cause

`mlflow.pyfunc.load_model()` dispatches to flavor `_load_pyfunc` implementations via:

``` # mlflow/pyfunc/__init__.py L1170-1172 model_impl = importlib.import_module(conf[MAIN])._load_pyfunc(data_path) ```

The guarded pattern (from `mlflow/sklearn/__init__.py` L526-533, the reference implementation) is:

``` if ( not MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION.get() and not is_in_databricks_runtime() and not is_in_databricks_model_serving_environment() ): raise MlflowException("Deserializing model using pickle is disallowed...") ```

`mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py` has **no such check**:

``` # L307-320 — no guard anywhere in this file def _load_model(path): import statsmodels.iolib.api as smio return smio.load_pickle(path) # calls pickle.load() directly

def _load_pyfunc(path): return _StatsmodelsModelWrapper(_load_model(path)) ```

`statsmodels.iolib.api.load_pickle` is a thin wrapper around `pickle.load`. Its own docstring warns: *"Never unpickle data received from an untrusted or unauthenticated source."*

---

## Trigger

An attacker crafts an MLmodel YAML that specifies `mlflow.statsmodels` as the loader module:

``` flavors: python_function: loader_module: mlflow.statsmodels data: model.pkl statsmodels: data: model.pkl statsmodels_version: 0.14.0 ```

With a malicious `model.pkl` placed alongside it in the artifact store, any call to:

``` os.environ["MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION"] = "False" mlflow.pyfunc.load_model("models:/MaliciousModel/1") ```

...deserializes the pickle file with **no guard check**, executing arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling process.

On default MLflow deployments (no `--app-name basic-auth`), authentication is disabled, so artifact upload requires no credentials.

---

## Affected Code

- `mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py` L307-310: `_load_model` — calls `smio.load_pickle` without checking `MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION` - `mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py` L313-320: `_load_pyfunc` — dispatches to `_load_model` without checking the control

Permalink (commit `0b0c576c`): - https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/blob/0b0c576c642b5b0d9496c829809c7d097403bc9f/mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py#L307-L310 - https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/blob/0b0c576c642b5b0d9496c829809c7d097403bc9f/mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py#L313-L320

---

## Recommended Fix

Add the missing guard to `mlflow/statsmodels/__init__.py`:

``` from mlflow.environment_variables import MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION from mlflow.utils.databricks_utils import ( is_in_databricks_model_serving_environment, is_in_databricks_runtime, )

def _load_model(path): if ( not MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION.get() and not is_in_databricks_runtime() and not is_in_databricks_model_serving_environment() ): raise MlflowException( "Deserializing model using pickle is disallowed, but this statsmodels " "model requires pickle deserialization. Set environment variable " "'MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION' to 'true' to allow this." ) import statsmodels.iolib.api as smio return smio.load_pickle(path) ```