GHSA-g3r5-9h93-4j2c

## Impact A TOCTOU race condition in the Git node's `clone` operation lets an authenticated user bypass its path restrictions by swapping a directory for a symlink after the path is validated but before the clone runs. This plants a crafted repository in the community node directory, which n8n loads as a custom node on the next restart, and since nodes execute JavaScript, this yields arbitrary code execution on the server.

Both self-hosted and cloud instances are affected, where authenticated users can create and run workflows using the Git node.

## Patches Users should upgrade to the patched version once available to remediate the vulnerability.

## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Git node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.git` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. - Restrict network egress from the n8n instance to prevent connections to attacker-controlled git repositories.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.