GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf

### Summary

A vulnerability in ZITADEL Actions V1 allows an organization Action author to read files from the ZITADEL host filesystem through the JavaScript `require()` module loader. On common self-hosted deployments this can be chained to steal bootstrap credentials (including the Login Client PAT) and escalate from a single-tenant organization owner to instance administrator.

### Impact

ZITADEL Actions V1 run custom JavaScript inside the ZITADEL server process at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points. The runtime enables the goja Node-compatible `require()` registry without restricting the source loader, so Action scripts can load host files readable by the ZITADEL process (notably `.js` and `.json`, and in some cases other file contents via error channels).

An attacker with **ORG_OWNER** on any organization (which includes `org.action.write` and `org.flow.write`) can therefore:

* Read process-readable host files, including configuration or secrets mounted into the API container (for example service-account material, projected secrets, or config carrying sensitive values). * On deployments that follow ZITADEL’s documented bootstrap paths (`ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH`, `ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH`), recover instance-wide credentials such as the **IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT** PAT or the **IAM_OWNER** service-account key, enabling escalation to full instance control.

This collapses the expected multi-tenant isolation boundary: a tenant organization administrator is not meant to access host filesystem secrets or instance-wide credentials.

**Scope note:** This issue affects **Actions V1**. Host command execution was not identified as part of this vulnerability. Impact depends on what the ZITADEL process can read on disk and on deployment layout — documented Compose and quick-start setups that write bootstrap PATs or machine keys into the API container amplify severity.

### Affected Versions

Systems running one of the following versions are affected:

* **4.x:** `4.0.0` through `4.16.0` (including RC versions) * **3.x:** `3.0.0` through `3.4.12` (including RC versions)

### Patches

The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch disables filesystem-backed module loading for Action scripts so that only the intended native `zitadel/*` modules can be required.

* **4.x**: Upgrade to $\ge$ [4.16.1](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.16.1) * **3.x**: Upgrade to $\ge$ [3.4.13](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.13)

### Workarounds

If an immediate upgrade is not possible:

* Restrict who can create, update, or attach Actions — do not grant `org.action.write` / `org.flow.write` (or **ORG_OWNER**) to untrusted administrators in multi-tenant environments. * Audit existing Actions for `require()` of filesystem paths. * Remove or relocate bootstrap credential files (`login-client.pat`, machine keys) so they are not readable inside the API process filesystem. * Limit host filesystem exposure for the ZITADEL process (no unnecessary readable secrets beside the binary).

### Questions

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [security@zitadel.com](mailto:security@zitadel.com)

### Credits

Thanks to Dor Konis ([@dkonis](https://github.com/dkonis)) and Feras Daragma ([@FerasTr](https://github.com/FerasTr)) from GE Vernova, and to [pyuysig](https://github.com/pyuysig), for finding and reporting this vulnerability.