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HIGH7.5

GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg

phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup

Quick fix

GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg — thorsten/phpmyfaq: upgrade to the fixed version with the command below.

composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.16

Details

### Summary An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.

### Details The endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.

Relevant code paths: - Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint: - `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]` - Controller implementation: - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` → `backup()` - No call to `hasValidToken()`, `userIsAuthenticated()`, or any permission check - Backup creation: - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php` → `createConfigBackup()` - Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under `content/core/config/`

### PoC Replace `BASE_URL` with your instance URL.

1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:

```bash BASE_URL="http://localhost" curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \ -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \ --data "4.1.0-RC" ```

Expected result: `200 OK` with JSON containing `backupFile`.

2) Copy the `backupFile` URL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):

```bash # Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1) curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip ```

3) Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:

```bash unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php ```

Observed: `database.php` is included and contains DB host/user/password.

### Impact - Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure. - Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default `.htaccess` rewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable. - Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.

Are you affected?

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Affected packages

Packagist/thorsten/phpmyfaq
Introduced in: 0Fixed in: 4.0.16
Fixcomposer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.16
Packagist/thorsten/phpmyfaq
Introduced in: 4.1.0-alpha

No fixed version published yet for thorsten/phpmyfaq (composer). Pin to a known-safe version or switch to an alternative.

References