GHSA-7mj9-2mp8-4m2p

### Summary

httpcore2 does not start TLS for `wss://` connections routed through a SOCKS5 proxy. The WebSocket opening handshake and all subsequent frames are sent in plaintext through the proxy path, despite the caller selecting the secure `wss` scheme.

The transport flaw affects httpcore2 releases before `2.10.0`. HTTPX2 exposed this behavior through its public `Client.websocket()` and `AsyncClient.websocket()` APIs from `2.6.0` through `2.9.1`.

### Details

The synchronous and asynchronous SOCKS5 connection implementations upgrade the established proxy tunnel to TLS only when the remote origin scheme is `https`. The equivalent check does not include `wss`. After the SOCKS5 handshake succeeds, the raw stream is therefore passed directly to the HTTP/1.1 connection, which writes the WebSocket upgrade request without first performing a TLS handshake or verifying the destination certificate.

For example, an application using HTTPX2 `2.6.0` through `2.9.1` may open an authenticated WebSocket through a SOCKS proxy:

```python import httpx2

with httpx2.Client(proxy="socks5://proxy.example:1080") as client: with client.websocket( "wss://service.example/private?token=query-secret", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer header-secret"}, cookies={"session": "cookie-secret"}, ) as websocket: websocket.send_text("private message") ```

On affected versions, the stream passing through the SOCKS proxy begins with a plaintext request such as:

```text GET /private?token=query-secret HTTP/1.1 Host: service.example Authorization: Bearer header-secret Cookie: session=cookie-secret ```

Before HTTPX2 `2.6.0`, the same underlying httpcore2 behavior could be reached by integrations constructing a WebSocket upgrade request through the low-level transport API, but HTTPX2 did not yet provide its native WebSocket client API.

A normal secure WebSocket server will usually reject these plaintext bytes because it expects a TLS ClientHello. However, a malicious or compromised SOCKS proxy can accept the SOCKS connection, observe the plaintext handshake, return a forged `101 Switching Protocols` response, and then read or modify WebSocket frames in both directions. An observer between the proxy and destination may also read the plaintext traffic.

RFC 6455 requires a client using a secure WebSocket connection to perform the TLS handshake before sending the WebSocket opening handshake. A `wss` URI promises confidentiality, integrity, and endpoint authentication through TLS.

### Impact

An attacker able to control or observe the SOCKS proxy path can obtain URL query parameters, authorization headers, cookies, and application messages that the caller expected TLS to protect. Because no TLS handshake occurs, certificate verification also does not occur, allowing an attacker controlling the proxy to impersonate the WebSocket server and inject or alter messages.

Only `wss://` connections routed through a SOCKS5 proxy are affected. Direct `wss://` connections and ordinary `https://` requests through SOCKS already start TLS correctly.

### Mitigation

Upgrade HTTPX2 and httpcore2 to `2.10.0` or later. Patched versions start TLS for both `https` and `wss` origins in the synchronous and asynchronous SOCKS5 connection paths.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not route `wss://` connections through a SOCKS proxy. Use a direct secure WebSocket connection or another transport that performs and verifies TLS to the WebSocket origin.