GHSA-7ghq-v6jf-g56c

## Summary

There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP/3 entry points: the `respondingTimeouts` settings were not applied to the HTTP/3 request path. `readTimeout` in particular is on by default at 60s and is documented as bounding the time to read the entire request including its body, but it is enforced as a deadline on the TCP connection, which cannot reach a QUIC stream, and Traefik's HTTP/3 server was constructed with no timeout of any kind. An unauthenticated client that trickles a request body therefore holds a request open for as long as it chooses, and with it one upstream connection per request, at negligible cost to itself. Backends with bounded connection pools are the practical pressure point.

The HTTP/3 path lost these timeouts in v2.8.2, when a quic-go API change removed the embedded `http.Server` that had carried them; every release from v2.8.2 onward is affected, and releases before v2.8.2 are not. Traefik v2.8.2 through v2.10.x and v3.0 through v3.6 are affected and are no longer maintained: they will not receive a patch on their own line, and the remedy for their users is to upgrade to v2.11.56 or v3.7.12.

## Patches

- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.56 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.12

## For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>

## Summary

`entryPoints.<name>.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout` is documented as:

> "Set the timeouts for incoming requests to the Traefik instance. This is the maximum > duration for reading the entire request, **including the body**." — **Default: 60s**

It is **on by default** and it works over HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2. It has **no effect on HTTP/3**.

The consequence is not that a hardening option was left unset. It is that every Traefik deployment with `http3` enabled carries a 60-second bound that the operator has every reason to believe is in force, and which is silently absent on that protocol. A single client trickling one body byte every few seconds holds a request open indefinitely, and with it one upstream connection per request.

`readTimeout` is applied as a deadline on the **TCP connection**. HTTP/3 does not have one, and Traefik's HTTP/3 server is constructed with no timeout of any kind.

## Steps to reproduce

No containers, VMs or cloud services — the official release binary, `curl`, `openssl`, and a 68-line Python standard-library backend. Everything is attached.

```sh bash reproduce.sh # readTimeout 5s, ~40 seconds MODE=default bash reproduce.sh # the stock 60s default, ~4 minutes ```

By hand:

**1. Static config** (`conf/traefik.yml`, complete and unredacted). Note there is no `respondingTimeouts` block at all — this is the documented 60s default:

```yaml global: checkNewVersion: false sendAnonymousUsage: false

log: level: DEBUG

entryPoints: websecure: address: ":8443" http3: advertisedPort: 8443

providers: file: filename: conf/dynamic.yml

api: dashboard: false ```

**2. Dynamic config** (`conf/dynamic.yml`):

```yaml http: routers: backend-router: rule: "PathPrefix(`/`)" service: backend-svc entryPoints: [websecure] tls: {} services: backend-svc: loadBalancer: servers: - url: "http://127.0.0.1:8080" tls: certificates: - certFile: cert.pem keyFile: key.pem ```

**3. A self-signed cert**, so no CA install and no sudo:

```sh openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -days 30 -nodes \ -subj "/CN=localhost" -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1" ```

**4. A backend that reads the request body** before responding, as a real HTTP/1.1 server does (`backend.py`, standard library only). This matters: a backend that answers the request headers alone lets Traefik release the upstream connection immediately, which hides the behaviour entirely.

```sh python3 backend.py 8080 & ./traefik --configFile=conf/traefik.yml ```

**5. The same slow upload over each protocol.** The hold must exceed the timeout under test, so 92 seconds against the 60-second default:

```sh { for i in $(seq 1 23); do printf 'x'; sleep 4; done; } | \ curl -v -k -T - --http1.1 https://localhost:8443/

{ for i in $(seq 1 23); do printf 'x'; sleep 4; done; } | \ curl -v -k -T - --http3-only https://localhost:8443/ ```

## Result

Traefik **v3.7.10** (`langres`, go1.26.5), official `traefik_v3.7.10_linux_amd64.tar.gz`, sha256 `01811bb12d44f17280550f425f5e3128d6c325f2665c09e67a651ca535f490ce`.

Upstream connection lifetime measured at the backend — the client's view only shows the *absence* of a server action, which proves nothing on its own:

| config | hold | HTTP/1.1 (control) | HTTP/3 | |---|---|---|---| | **stock — documented 60s default** | 92 s | **59.99 s** — released at the documented default | **92.94 s** — held for the entire window | | `readTimeout: 5s` | 30 s | **4.99 s** | **30.98 s** |

The HTTP/1.1 column is the control and it is the point of the exercise: the timeout is demonstrably live on this exact binary, releasing the upstream at its configured value. The HTTP/3 request, in the same run against the same instance with the same setting, ran to completion with the upstream pinned throughout. Traefik returned `499` on the aborted HTTP/1.1 arm and took no action at all on HTTP/3 — no `RST_STREAM`, no `H3_REQUEST_INCOMPLETE`, no connection close.

The setting is not being silently discarded: Traefik's own DEBUG log prints the loaded static configuration including `"respondingTimeouts":{"idleTimeout":"3m0s","readTimeout":"5s"}`. Full `curl -v` output, backend logs and Traefik DEBUG logs for every arm are in `evidence/`.

## Cause

**`readTimeout` is a TCP connection deadline** — `pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp.go:273`:

```go if e.transportConfiguration.RespondingTimeouts.ReadTimeout > 0 { err := writeCloser.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Duration(e.transportConfiguration.RespondingTimeouts.ReadTimeout))) ```

A deadline on a TCP connection cannot reach a QUIC stream.

**And the HTTP/3 server is given no timeout of any kind** — `pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp_http3.go:65`:

```go h3.Server = &http3.Server{ Addr: config.GetAddress(), Port: config.HTTP3.AdvertisedPort, Handler: httpsServer.Server.(*http.Server).Handler, TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetConfigForClient: h3.getTLSConfigForClient}, QUICConfig: &quic.Config{ Allow0RTT: false, }, ConnContext: func(ctx context.Context, c *quic.Conn) context.Context { ```

It reuses the HTTPS server's **handler** and inherits none of its timeouts. There is therefore no duration control on the HTTP/3 request path at all — not `readTimeout`, not `idleTimeout`, nothing.

Note that this cannot be fixed by passing a field through: quic-go's `http3.Server` exposes no request-read deadline. The remedy has to be enforced around the request body inside the handler, or upstream in quic-go.

## Suggested remedy

In preference order:

1. **Enforce `readTimeout` on the HTTP/3 path in the handler.** Traefik already passes the HTTPS server's handler to `http3.Server`, so when `RespondingTimeouts.ReadTimeout > 0` it can wrap `r.Body` for HTTP/3 requests in a reader that enforces the deadline. 2. Add a request-read deadline upstream in quic-go's `http3.Server` and pass it through. 3. **At minimum, document it.** See below — the current documentation does not tell an operator this.

### A sketch of option 1

Offered as a description of the shape, **not as a patch**. I have not built or tested this against Traefik, and I am not going to present untested code as though I had. If a working, tested patch would be useful, say so and I will prepare one properly and verify it against the reproducer above.

Where the HTTP/3 handler is wired up — `server_entrypoint_tcp_http3.go`, around the `http3.Server` construction — the handler passed in could be wrapped so that, when `ReadTimeout` is configured, an HTTP/3 request body carries the same deadline the TCP path gets from `SetReadDeadline`:

```go // Roughly: for HTTP/3 requests only, and only when the timeout is set. if readTimeout > 0 && r.ProtoMajor == 3 && r.Body != nil { r.Body = deadlineBody(r.Body, readTimeout) } ```

The part worth knowing, because it is what makes the approach work rather than merely look tidy: **closing the request body cancels the QUIC stream read.** In quic-go, `http3`'s body `Close()` calls `str.CancelRead(...)`, which unblocks a `Read` that is already parked waiting on the client. So a timer that closes the body on expiry bounds both a client that trickles *and* a client that simply stops sending — the latter being the case a wrapper that only checks the clock on each returning `Read` would miss entirely.

Returning `os.ErrDeadlineExceeded` from the wrapped `Read` keeps the failure classified as a timeout rather than a client abort, which matters for whatever status code and logging you decide is right.

Two design questions I would not want to answer on your behalf: whether HTTP/3 should reuse `respondingTimeouts.readTimeout` or get its own setting, and whether enforcement belongs in the handler wrapper or somewhere closer to the entrypoint. Both are your call.

## A documentation issue, separately

Two things in the docs are worth correcting regardless of how the code question is resolved.

**1. The `readTimeout` description carries no protocol qualification.** It says "the maximum duration for reading the entire request, including the body", which is exactly what an operator relies on. The entrypoint page does note that respondingTimeouts have "no effect for UDP entryPoints", but that does not cover this case: HTTP/3 here is served on an **HTTP** entrypoint with an `http3:` block, not on a Traefik **UDP entrypoint**, which is a separate feature for UDP routers. An operator who adds `http3:` to their existing HTTPS entrypoint has not created a UDP entrypoint and has no reason to read that caveat as applying to them.

**2. `SECURITY.md`'s supported-versions table is stale.** It lists `3.6.x` as supported and `< 3.6.x` as unsupported, while 3.7.10 is the current release. Anyone checking whether their version is in scope before reporting gets a confusing answer.

## Impact

Each held request occupies one upstream connection for as long as the client chooses, at negligible cost to the client, and the same client can open many. Backends with bounded connection pools are the practical pressure point.

I have **not** measured a concurrency ceiling on Traefik itself, so I am not asserting one. If that number matters to your assessment, tell me and I will measure it.

## LLM ("AI") use disclosure

Not required by your policy, but stated because it is true and you should be able to weigh it. I am a penetration tester, not a Go developer. The finding, the attack concept and the decision to measure the upstream leg rather than the client are mine. An LLM coding assistant (Claude) built the test harness, ran the matrix, and located the two source citations; I verified those by hand against the `v3.7.10` tag and ran the reproducer myself. I am a human and I will be the one replying in this thread.

## Disclosure

Bishop Fox operates a 90-day disclosure policy, starting the day this is submitted, with extensions where a fix is in progress. Tell me what you would prefer and I will work to it.

## Environment

- Traefik v3.7.10, official `traefik_v3.7.10_linux_amd64.tar.gz`, sha256 `01811bb12d44f17280550f425f5e3128d6c325f2665c09e67a651ca535f490ce` - Kali GNU/Linux (WSL2), kernel 6.6.114.1 - curl 8.19.0 with ngtcp2 1.21.0 / nghttp3 1.15.0### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._

### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._

### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

</details> ---