GHSA-5w7r-f4cg-rqq7

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72799](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72799).

### Summary

Five filetree endpoints resolve arbitrary document IDs and paths with no publish-access check of any kind. All are `CheckAuth`-only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader can map the complete private document tree every notebook, folder, and document title, and which notebook holds each document for documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden, and can resolve titles to document IDs.

### Details

None of the following handlers invokes `IsReadOnlyRoleContext`, `CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess`, or `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore`:

| Endpoint | Returns | Discloses | |---|---|---| | `getFullHPathByID` (router 159) | `GetFullHPathByID(id)` | full title path including notebook, e.g. `/MySecretNotebook/Confidential/Q3 Layoffs Plan` | | `getHPathByID` (router 157) | `GetHPathByID(id)` | document-relative title path | | `getPathByID` (router 158) | `{path, notebook}` | which notebook a document lives in, plus its `.sy` storage path | | `getIDsByHPath` (router 160) | `GetIDsByHPath(path, notebook)` | title-path → document-ID enumeration | | `getHPathByPath` (router 155) | HPath from a storage path | title path from a storage path |

Each accepts an arbitrary ID or HPath and resolves it identically for hidden, publish-forbidden, and password-protected documents.

This enables two operations for an unauthenticated caller: 1. **Map the private document tree**: `getFullHPathByID` and `getPathByID` yield every notebook/folder/document title and its containing notebook. 2. **Resolve titles to IDs**: `getIDsByHPath` converts a known or guessed title path into document IDs, which are the required input for other block-read endpoints.

Document titles and HPaths are precisely the block metadata that the project's block-metadata restriction (commit `ffde3b21e`) set out to protect; that change gated `getBlockInfo`, `getDocInfo`, and `getDocsInfo` but left this entire path-resolution family open.

**Guarded-sibling asymmetry.** `getRecentDocs` (`FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess`), `getCriteria` (`FilterCriteriaByPublishAccess`), and `getLocalStorage` (`FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess`) all filter document references for reader sessions. The codebase clearly publish-scopes reader-visible metadata elsewhere; these five endpoints do not.

Verified at `origin/master` (`eef105683`): all five handler bodies contain no publish-access call; the storage-family siblings contain their filters; all five routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`.

### Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. A document exists in a notebook marked publish-forbidden or password-protected.

**Resolve a private document's full title path:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getFullHPathByID {"id":"<DOC_ID>"} → /MySecretNotebook/Confidential/Q3 Layoffs Plan ```

**Identify its notebook and storage path:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getPathByID {"id":"<DOC_ID>"} → {"path":"/....sy","notebook":"<BOX_ID>"} ```

**Enumerate IDs from a title path:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getIDsByHPath {"path":"/Confidential","notebook":"<BOX_ID>"} → document IDs under a folder the reader cannot otherwise access ```

Each returns data for documents excluded from publishing; no password or membership is required.

### Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can enumerate the complete private document structure: notebook names, folder hierarchy, and document titles for content the administrator marked hidden, password-protected, or excluded from publishing. Document titles alone are frequently sensitive (project names, personnel actions, client identifiers). The ID-resolution direction additionally supplies valid document IDs, removing the "attacker must know an ID" precondition for other block-read endpoints. Confidentiality-only.

### Suggested fix

For `IsReadOnlyRoleContext` sessions, gate each of the five handlers with `CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess` (or restrict resolution to publish-visible documents), mirroring the treatment already applied in `getRecentDocs`, `getCriteria`, and `getLocalStorage`.