GHSA-5476-xc4j-rqcv

### Impact

c3p0 is vulnerable to attack via maliciously crafted Java-serialized objects and `javax.naming.Reference` instances. Several c3p0 `ConnectionPoolDataSource` implementations have a property called `userOverridesAsString` which conceptually represents a `Map<String,Map<String,String>>`. Prior to v0.12.0, that property was maintained as a hex-encoded serialized object. Any attacker able to reset this property, on an existing `ConnectionPoolDataSource` or via maliciously crafted serialized objects or `javax.naming.Reference` instances could be tailored execute unexpected code on the application's `CLASSPATH`.

The danger of this vulnerability was strongly magnified by vulnerabilities in c3p0's main dependency, mchange-commons-java. This library includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including ungated support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values. Attackers could set c3p0's `userOverridesAsString` hex-encoded serialized objects that include objects "indirectly serialized" via JNDI references. Deserialization of those objects and dereferencing of the embedded `javax.naming.Reference` objects could provoke download and execution of malicious code from a remote `factoryClassLocation`.

Although hazard presented by c3p0's vulnerabilites are exarcerbated by vulnerabilities in mchange-commons-java, use of Java-serialized-object hex as the format for a writable Java-Bean property, of objects that may be exposed across JNDI interfaces, represents a serious independent fragility.

### Patches

The `userOverridesAsString` property of c3p0 `ConnectionPoolDataSource` classes has been reimplemented to use a safe CSV-based format, rather than rely upon potentially dangerous Java object deserialization.

c3p0-0.12.0+ and above depend upon mchange-commons-java 0.4.0+, which gates support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values. Those parameters are documented [here](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security).

c3p0 additionally enforces the new mchange-commons-java `com.mchange.v2.naming.nameGuardClassName` to prevent injection of unexpected, potentially remote JNDI names.

### Workarounds

Users should upgrade to c3p0-0.12.0 or above. There is no supported workaround for earlier versions of c3p0.

### References

[c3p0, you little rascal &mdash; Hans-Martin Münch](https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2025/02/c3p0-you-little-rascal/) [c3p0 documentation, security note](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#security-note) [c3p0 documentation, configuring security](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security)