PYSEC-2026-4249

## Summary

PraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware **only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set**, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/runs` accepts an attacker-controlled `webhook_url`; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via `httpx`. The `webhook_url` has an SSRF validator (`gethostbyname` + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while `httpx` re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an **unauthenticated, blind** SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.

## Details

### Affected component - Package: `praisonai` 4.6.63. Files: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`, `jobs/router.py`, `jobs/executor.py`, `jobs/models.py`.

### Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`

Function: `create_app`

Snippet: ```python jobs_api_key = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY") # ... if jobs_api_key: app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware) # auth ONLY when env var is set ``` Issue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is `127.0.0.1`.

Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py`

Function: `submit_job`

Snippet: ```python @router.post("", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202) async def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...): # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...) await executor.submit(job) ``` Issue: attacker-controlled `webhook_url` flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.

Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py` (validator) and `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py` (sink)

Function: `validate_webhook_url` → `_send_webhook`

Snippet: ```python # models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time) ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...: raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address")

# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning) async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client: response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...) ``` Issue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the `httpx.post` connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.

### Attack flow 1. Operator runs the Jobs API without `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` (default → unauth). 2. Attacker `POST /api/v1/runs` with `webhook_url` = a rebinding domain. 3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion `httpx.post` re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal.

### Why existing protection is bypassed Auth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The `webhook_url` validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)

### Security boundary Unauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind `127.0.0.1` limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.

## Proof of Concept

### Environment Real Jobs API (`python -m praisonai.jobs.server`, no API key) in a local runtime (`127.0.0.1:18085`), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\` (`docker-compose.jobs.yml`).

### Steps to reproduce 1. `PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth`: `POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello"}` → `202` (no auth). 2. `PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind`: `POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello","webhook_url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}` → `202`.

### Expected result Unauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.

## Impact Unauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.

## Suggested remediation - Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway. - For `webhook_url`: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.