GHSA-3gx8-q682-38mx

### Summary The `roadiz/openid` package generates an OIDC nonce in `OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate()` and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but **never stores it** and **never validates it** on the callback. The `OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory` validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and `OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate()` never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value.

### Details In `src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php`, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP: ```php 'nonce' => $this->tokenGenerator->generateToken(), ``` However, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store.

In `src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php`, the JWT validation constraints are: - `LooseValidAt` (expiry) - `PermittedFor` (audience) - `IssuedBy` (issuer) - `HostedDomain` (optional) - `UserInfoEndpoint` (optional)

**No nonce constraint is present.**

In `src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php`, the `authenticate()` method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the `nonce` claim in the ID token.

### PoC 1. Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect). 2. Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired. 3. Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token's validity window.

Additionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently.

### Impact - **ID token replay attacks**: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period. - **Token injection attacks**: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection. - Affects any Roadiz application using the `roadiz/openid` package with OpenID Connect SSO.

The OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the `nonce` claim if it was present in the authorization request.