GHSA-2mr3-rxrq-238c
Flyto2 Core: http.paginate follows server-supplied next-page URLs (Link header / cursor) without SSRF revalidation
Quick fix
GHSA-2mr3-rxrq-238c — flyto-core: upgrade to the fixed version with the command below.
pip install --upgrade 'flyto-core>=2.26.8'Details
## Summary `http.paginate` validates only the initial `base_url`, then follows server-supplied pagination targets (RFC 5988 `Link: rel="next"` headers, cursor/offset URLs) in a loop **without revalidating each follow-up URL**. An attacker's first-page response can point `next` at an internal address, causing a second-order SSRF whose internal body is aggregated into the returned items.
## Root Cause `src/core/modules/atomic/http/paginate.py:495` validates `base_url` (first URL only). The pagination loop `_paginate_link_header` reads `next_url` via `_parse_link_header` (:203), sets `url=next_url` (:208), and calls `session.request(method, url)` (:196) with NO validate call in the loop (:186-208 has zero guard calls).
## Impact Readable second-order SSRF that bypasses the SSRF control; internal/metadata body aggregated into `all_items` and returned to the caller (C:H, S:C).
## Proof of Concept Verified live: `http.paginate` with allowlisted base `127.0.0.1` followed a `Link: <http://127.0.0.3/...>; rel="next"` (non-allowlisted) and returned `INTERNAL-NEXTPAGE-SECRET` in the aggregated items. ``` execute_module http.paginate {"url":"http://attacker.tld/p1","strategy":"link_header"} attacker p1 response header: Link: <http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/>; rel="next" ```
## Attack Chain 1. Entry: `http.paginate {url:"http://attacker.tld/p1", strategy:"link_header"}`. Guard: `validate_url_with_env_config(base_url)` (paginate.py:495) — validates the FIRST url only. 2. Sink: `_paginate_link_header` reads `next_url` (`_parse_link_header` :203), `url=next_url` (:208), `session.request(method,url)` (:196) — NO validate call in the loop. Bypass proof: only :495 validates; loop at :186-208 has zero guard calls. 3. Impact: internal body aggregated into `all_items` and returned → readable second-order SSRF.
## Bypass Evidence Live PoC followed a `Link` header into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker in aggregated results. Only `base_url` is validated; the follow loop never revalidates.
## Affected Versions `<= 2.26.6` — `paginate.py:495` + loop present on latest release tag.
## Suggested Fix Run every follow-up URL (Link header, cursor, offset target) through `validate_url_with_env_config` before fetching it inside the pagination loop.
## Credit
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
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