EEF-CVE-2026-82752

## Summary

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it.

Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max\_length and min\_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply\_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string\_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max\_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound.

The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed.

This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0.

## Configuration

A resource attribute must carry a max\_length constraint (or an equivalent string\_length validation) fed from client input, and the data layer must impose no independent size limit of its own. The ETS and Mnesia data layers and Postgres text columns store the value in full; a Postgres varchar(n) column bounds it independently and is not exposed.