EEF-CVE-2026-54885

## Summary

Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

Three code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch\_unsigned\_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request\_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request\_uri) |> Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse\_registration\_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks\_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh\_jwk\_from\_jwks\_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks\_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request\_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server's HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.

This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.

## Workaround

Restrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth request\_uri dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed.