MAL-2026-6428

The `leo-cron` npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account `czirker` belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.

The malicious payload is triggered automatically during `npm install` via a `binding.gyp` file using node-gyp command expansion (`<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)`), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced `index.js` (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:

- Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys. - AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code. - Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem. - GitHub persistence: Creates orphan `snapshot-<hex>` branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.

Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (52a0b87288e27f81313e89ac69303ce3aa2dd80fde26ce278bed22c8a524ab98) binding.gyp at line 6 contains GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...) / <!@(...) / <@(...)) inside the targets/sources fields. npm implicitly invokes node-gyp rebuild whenever a package contains a binding.gyp, and GYP evaluates command-expansion expressions as shell during the configure step — so the embedded command runs automatically on every `npm install` of this package, even though package.json declares no install/postinstall script. This is functionally equivalent to a lifecycle hook and executes attacker-chosen code on the installer's machine. The package has no apparent legitimate need for a native addon build via binding.gyp, indicating the file's only purpose is to fire the embedded shell command at install.