MAL-2026-6421

The `leo-cli` npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account `czirker` belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.

The malicious payload is triggered automatically during `npm install` via a `binding.gyp` file using node-gyp command expansion (`<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)`), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced `index.js` (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:

- Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys. - AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code. - Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem. - GitHub persistence: Creates orphan `snapshot-<hex>` branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.

Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (520c95e9cea55807cedb7f42a819fdb63febb61fe9a392b3de8f31f129cfa0fc) The package ships a binding.gyp file containing GYP command-expansion syntax (`<!(...)`) in its target configuration. npm implicitly invokes `node-gyp rebuild` whenever a binding.gyp is present — even without an explicit install/postinstall script — and node-gyp evaluates `<!(...)` expressions as shell commands during the configure step. This causes arbitrary shell execution on the installer's machine on `npm install`, functionally equivalent to a lifecycle hook. Additional files (docker/run.js, docker-run.js, lib/build.js, lib/defaultCronRunner.js) combine child_process and outbound HTTP usage, broadening the install/runtime risk surface, though the binding.gyp command-expansion alone is sufficient grounds for installer-side concern.