MAL-2026-5707

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## Source: amazon-inspector (98ea79d9fce12a87d3949dc748617f8077a1ae0822fadab451c27d2c8a2feb9b) ttspc-server-sample@99.9.0 declares `postinstall: node index.js` in package.json, so on `npm install` it automatically executes index.js. The script collects the installer's hostname, username, current working directory, network interface IPs/MACs, OS info, the presence of env vars including credential-shaped names (APP_KEY/APP_SECRET/etc.), and the full process list (`ps aux` on Unix, `tasklist /V` on Windows), then HTTP POSTs the JSON payload to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator endpoint at http://dduqpvg687wohv3ymaiaa3j2etks8swh.oastify.com (with a secondary reference to http://your-id.burpcollaborator.net). The package self-labels via `X-PoC-Type: dependency-confusion` / `X-PoC-Package: ttspc-server-sample` headers and uses an inflated 99.9.0 version designed to win semver resolution against a victim org's private internal package of the same name. Even framed as a PoC, the install-time exfiltration of host identifiers, internal IP addresses, credential-variable names, and running process inventory to an attacker-controlled OAST host is a real supply-chain attack against any installer that resolves this public package instead of the intended private one.

## Source: ossf-package-analysis (91d0c4ae89a4f630e59ca4960fdff3832c8fa9d4b7dbbdf148abe39b260c7ec8) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'ttspc-server-sample' @ 99.9.0 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.